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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Appellee/Respondent,

:

Case No. 20041118-SC

v.

:

Ct. App. No. 20030817-CA

RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS,

:

Appellant/Petitioner.

:
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
ON CERTIORARI REVIEW

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
By order dated April 19, 2005, this Court granted petitioner's request for certiorari
review of the court of appeals' unanimous, unpublished decision in State v. Norris, 2004 UT
App 452,2004 WL 2749484 ("Norris IF) (decision attached in Addendum A). This Court
has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Is the Utah communications fraud statute overbroad under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution?1

'The same issue is currently before this Court on certiorari review in another case
involving the same defendant and different charges. See State v. Norris, Case No.
20040880-SC.

Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court of
appeals, not of the trial court. See State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1997); State v.
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196,1199 (Utah 1995). Whether a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad
is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT
14,lf5,86P.3d735.
Issue 2: The State appealed a circuit court judge's dismissal of misdemeanor charges
related to this case, then obtained voluntary dismissal of the appeal. Did the district court
have jurisdiction to accept a related felony information filed two days after premature issuance
of the remittitur in the misdemeanor appeal where the self-executing nature of the court of
appeals' judgment left a valid order of dismissal in the circuit court which, upon issuance of
the remittitur, ended the circuit court case?
Standard of Review: Whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction is a
question of law reviewed for correctness with no deference to the lower court. See Beaver
County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, f 8 31 P.3d 1147.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
§ 76-10-1801. Communications fraud—Elements—Penalties
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain
from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly
with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or
artifice is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300;

2

(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud
is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained
by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as provided in Subsection (l)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense
described in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (1)
to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary
element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of communication
fraud.
(6)(a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, make
known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit
information.
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, telephone,
telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.
Laws 1985, c. 157, § 2; Laws 1990, c. 79, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 24, eff. May 1, 1995.
(In Addendum B).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. The criminal conduct giving rise to these proceedings occurredfromMarch through
June, 1993 (R. 0165).

3

2. The West Valley City attorney initially charged defendant in December 1994 with
four misdemeanor counts of communications fraud in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-101801(1) in the Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department (R. 0165, 0384, 0621-22).
3. In February 1996, on defendant's motion to quash the misdemeanor charges, the
circuit court judge dismissed the charges because that the aggregate of the four counts
exceeded the circuit court's jurisdictional limit of $1,000 (R. 0165, 0387-88, 0678-83).
4. The West Valley City Attorney appealed the dismissal to the Utah Court of Appeals
(R. 0165, 0388, 0700-08).
5. In October 1996, the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office ["DA's office"] charged
defendant in the Third District Court with eleven felony counts of communications fraud (R.
0165, 0176, 0232, 0392, 0730-35).
6. Defendant moved to quash the felony charges because the West Valley appeal was
still pending (R. 0166, 0393-94, 0740). Judge Palmer granted the motion and dismissed the
charges without prejudice on December 10,1996, noting that the State could refile the charges
upon dismissal of the misdemeanor appeal (R. 0166, 0232, 0394, 0740).
7. The State immediately sought to dismiss the appeal (R. 0201-02, 0394, 0742).
Defendant actively opposed the dismissal because of the prosecutor's intent to file felony
charges, but the appellate court dismissed the appeal on March 26,1997 (R. 0785,0788-89).
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8. In early April, 1997, ten of the felony charges were re-filed on the belief that the
misdemeanor appeal had been dismissed (R. 1-6).2
9. Defendant, through counsel, moved to dismiss the felony charges on April 10,1997,
arguing that the necessary remittitur had not issued (R. 23-48). Judge Dever granted
defendant's motion and again dismissed the charges without prejudice (R. 1860: 27).
10. Defendant, pro se, sought dismissal of the charges withprejudice two weeks later
(R. 68-80). He did not file supplemental documents to support his motion until three months
later (R. 84-103).
11. The remittitur issued May 13, 1997 (R. 82), and the DA's office refiled twenty
felony communications fraud charges on May 15,1997 (R. 2-11). In the meantime, defendant
asked the Court of Appeals to reconsider the dismissal of the appeal (R. 790, 1066-67).
Defendant also filed a petition for writ of certiorari (R. 1067), then filed an extraordinary writ
to recall the remittitur because it issued prior to expiration of the time for filing the petition
for writ of certiorari (R. 210, 214, 791-92, 796, 1066-67).
12. At the same time, defendant filed in the district court on May 20,1997, a motion
to strike the most recent information (R. 35-80; R. 1864:4).

2

The record consists largely of pleadings and transcripts from district court case
no. 971008355, from which this appeal arises. There is also a pleading file and transcript
from the immediately preceding case, no. 971005698. Few citations to the latter case are
necessary and will be indicated in this brief in bold typeface.
5

13. Defendant's request for an extraordinary writ prompted the Utah Supreme Court
to order recall of the remittitur on June 26,1997 (R. 0398,0792,0795). The Court of Appeals
recalled its remittitur by order dated June 30,1997, and defendant sought certiorari review of
the dismissal of the original appeal in both the Utah Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court (R. 0398-99, 0792, 0795). Both courts denied certiorari review, and the case
was again remitted to the trial court on October 30, 1998 (R. 0166-67, 0216, 0233, 0399,
0406,0792-93,0831).
14. While pursuing certiorari review of the misdemeanor appeal, defendant, through
counsel, again sought dismissal of the felony charges in the district court on September 26,
1997 (R. 109).
15. On November 19, 1997, after several additional filings and appearances by
defendant in the trial court, and while the certiorari proceedings were under way in the
misdemeanor appeal, Judge Dever denied defendant's multiple motions to dismiss with
prejudice, denied his motion to strike the information, and declared that he would entertain
no further hearings, motions or argument until the misdemeanor appeal was once again
remitted (R. 1864: 1-4; 1865).
16. After the final remittitur issued, Judge Dever again denied defendant's motion to
dismiss on December 4, 1998, and set the case for preliminary hearing (R. 153).3

3

Judge Dever signed the order on February 2, 1999 (R. 0402, 1008), and defendant
unsuccessfully attempted to appeal that decision and to obtain certiorari review in the
Utah Supreme Court (R. 0402-03, 1010-14, 1016).
6

17. The preliminary hearing occurred February 3 and 26,1999 (R. 1866,1867). The
State dismissed eight of the twenty charges when four victims did not appear at the
preliminary hearing (R. 0151; R. 1868: 27). Defendant was bound over on the remaining
twelve charges (R. 1868: 36-37).
18. Following the bindover, the State filed an amended information to accurately
reflect the remaining twelve felony counts (R. 218-23).
19. Defendant sought and obtained new counsel and, in the months prior to the
November 17,1999 trial setting, filed several pre-trial motions, both through counsel and pro
se (R. 159-217,240-45,264-68,270-72,273-82,305-17,319-27,328-52,364-1123). Only
one—a request for supplemental discovery—was granted (R. 1873: 45-51, 69-70; 80-84).
The last of his motions, which included a repeated request for substitute counsel, were denied
the morning of trial (R. 364-1123; R. 1536:2-10,12-22,24)).
20. The court recessed after disposing of the pre-trial matters. When it reconvened,
defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to counts I and III of the amended information (R.
1536: 25-26, 53-54). The remaining counts were dismissed.
21. Two weeks later, on December 1, 1999, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty
pleas and again requested appointment of counsel (R. 1203-79,1280-1333). He also sought
new counsel through a petition for an extraordinary writ, which the court of appeals denied
as frivolous on its face (R. 1457-77).
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22. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms on each of the two felony counts
(R. 1481-88). He sought a certificate of probable cause which the trial court later denied,
along with the motion to withdraw the pleas (R. 1489-95, 1519-21; docket #2 at 19).
23. Defendant timely appealed his conviction and sentence, and the court of appeals
reversed and remanded the case based on possible confusion in the terms of the plea bargain
(R. 1592-97).
24. On remand, defendant withdrew his guilty pleas, and the matter was set for a
seven-day trial (R. 1614-16).
25. Defendant again filed a series of motions (R. 1639-41,1643-48,1649-1781). The
trial court granted defendant additional time, and the State responded to each motion (R.
1633-34, 1782-1804). Thereafter, the trial court denied the motion to recall the warrant and
vacate bail (R. 1809). Several motions were not ruled on because of the subsequent entry of
defendant's pleas.
26. On September 8, 2003, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to two charges
of attempted communications fraud, both class A misdemeanors, reserving for appeal the
"narrow issues of the constitutionality of the charging statute and jurisdictional issues
previously raised with the Court and presently the subject of the appeal from judgment in the
Fourth District Court case, which is presently on appeal" (R. 1814-22; 1827-28).4 The trial

4

Defendant did not challenge the validity of his guilty plea on appeal.
8

court conducted a rule 11 colloquy, and defendant executed his supporting affidavit (R. 181422; R. 1883:2-18).
27. Defendant was sentenced the same day to two terms of one year in jail, received
credit for time served and was released (R. 1823-26, 1827-28).
28. Defendant timely appealed to this Court (R. 1829-30).
STATEMENT OF FACTS5
Defendant purported to operate a business that sold diet products (R. 0607, 0648; R.
1866: 11, 36, 57-58, 69, 75-76, 115). During the spring of 1993, defendant ran ads in Utah
newspapers promising a $ 1400.00 per month salary and benefits for diet consultants (R. 0608,
0610-12, 0647-48; R. 1866: 8-11, 69, 95, 101). When someone answered an ad, defendant
would give a presentation and produce several contracts relating to the diet products (R. 0608,
0610, 0613; R. 1866:9-12, 58, 95-97). Defendant purported to explain the terms of the
contracts and obtained signaturesfromseveral people (R. 0608, 0611, 0613; R. 1866:12-13,
15,31-32). While the individuals believed they were agreeing to take delivery of the product
to sell in conjunction with consulting, they were instead signing contracts to purchase the diet
products themselves (R. 0608-11, 0614, 0648; 1866: 12-13, 17, 104-05, 117). Defendant
directed the individuals to use the product so as to have first hand knowledge of it, then

5

The facts underlying defendant's convictions are not relevant to resolution of the
questions presented for certiorari review. Hence, the State provides a minimal synopsis
of the facts which it takes from the amended information (R. 218-23) and the preliminary
hearing transcript (R. 1866 & 1867).
9

refused attempts to return the product, in part because it had been opened (R. 0608, 0612,
0648;R. 1866:12-13,17-18,53,59-60,118-19). Despite defendant's promises in the ad and
in person, the victims in this case received no salary, received none of the promised benefits,
and incurred unanticipated debt (R. 0608,0648; R. 1866:12,18,32,42-43,110-11,61,76-77,
99-100, 110-11, 115, 117-18). Defendant then sued the victims in small claims court for
alleged breach of the contracts when the individuals refused or could not afford to pay for the
diet products (R. 0648; R. 19, 63-64, 74, 78, 79-80, 100, 119, 136).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I:

Relying on the analysis contained in a recently-published decision

involving different communications fraud charges filed against this defendant, the court of
appeals properly determined that the communications fraud statute is not constitutionally
overbroad. A law that targets harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct may nevertheless
be challenged as unconstitutional if it also prohibits a substantial amount of conduct protected
by the First Amendment. The First Amendment does not, however, protect false statements
that are made intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth. Utah's statute
punishes only those falsehoods or material omissions made intentionally, knowingly, or with
reckless disregard for the truth. Accordingly, Utah's communications fraud statute does not
reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct and is not constitutionally
overbroad.

10

POINT II; The district court had jurisdiction over the criminal conduct at issue herein
at all times. The circuit court recognized that fact when it dismissed the misdemeanor charges
because the aggregate of the four counts exceeded the circuit court's jurisdictional limit of
$1,000. The court of appeals recognized that fact in its order granting the State's voluntary
dismissal of the misdemeanor appeal (R. 0785). Defendant fails to support his assumption
that the district court's jurisdiction is dependent upon the validity of the circuit court's
jurisdiction. He fails to establish his claim that the district court did not have jurisdiction over
the filing of the felony information in the district court two days after issuance of the
premature remittitur in the misdemeanor appeal because the remittitur did not revest
jurisdiction in the circuit court. Consequently, there is no flaw in the district court's
jurisdiction over the felony information filed on May 15, 1997.
Alternatively, the court of appeals correctly rejected defendant's claim that the district
court lacked jurisdiction because the remittitur failed to revest jurisdiction in the circuit court.
Based on this Court's analysis in Chase Manhattan Bank v. Principal Funding Corp, the
court of appeals properly concluded that the appellate court's dismissal of the misdemeanor
appeal on the State's motion constituted a self-executing judgment. That ruling left intact the
lower court's order of dismissal from which the appeal had been taken, leaving nothing more
for the circuit court judge to do upon remittitur. Consequently, the lower court's dismissal
order became valid upon issuance of the remittitur, ending the circuit court case and leaving
no jurisdictional barrier to the felony filing of related charges in the district court two days
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later. The subsequent recall of the remittitur did not change the validity of the district court
filing, and the district court properly stayed further action pending defendant's continued
attempts to obtain certiorari review of the State's dismissed misdemeanor appeal.
Defendant's additional argument concerning the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine is
outside the scope of this court's grant of certiorari and should not be reviewed.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE IS NOT OVERBROAD
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
The court of appeals' decision in this case regarding defendant's constitutional
overbreadth challenge rested on an opinion published during this appeal in a case in which
the same defendant made the same challenge to the same statute following his conviction of
unrelated communications fraud charges. See State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 452, 24 WL
2749484 ("Norris IF) (relying on State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267,ffif8-16, 97 P.3d 732
("Norris i")). In Norris /, the court of appeals "concludefd] that the communications fraud
statute is not overbroad on its face." Norris /, 2004 UT App 267, ffif 7-11 (attached in
Addendum C). The court observed that the statute does not prohibit all falsehoods or
material omissions, but "only those where an individual seeks 'to defraud another or to obtain
from another money, property, or anything of value.'" Id. at ^ 11 (quoting Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1801(1)(1999)). The court also noted that the statute prohibits only those falsehoods
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or material omissions that are "'made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless
disregard for the truth. ™Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(7)). The Court observed
that the statute thus "draws the distinction between criminal and innocent behavior" with a
mens rea consistent with the standard set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 279 n.19, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964). Norris /, 2004 UT App 267, Tf 11. As such, the court
concluded, section 76-10-1801 is not substantially overbroad and should not be invalidated.
Id
Defendant contends that the ruling is erroneous, arguing that the statute is
constitutionally overbroad because it punishes the making of "any intentional or recklessly
uttered falsehood designed to obtain something of value" even in the absence of any intent
to defraud. Pet Br. at 15-19. This broad scope, he argues, punishes a "significant amount[]
of constitutionally protected speech[,]" rendering the statute overbroad. Id.
To the contrary, the ruling in Norris /, acknowledged and applied in this case, is
accurate.
A,

THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE
Generally, "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not

challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to
others in situations not before the Court." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,767, 102 S.Ct.
3348, 3360 (1982); accord State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987). The First
Amendment doctrine of overbreadth is an exception to this rule, permitting a defendant "to
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challenge a statute on behalf of others not before the court even if the law could be
constitutionally applied to the defendant." Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, f 10,
86 P.3d 735 (quotation omitted).
Statutory overbreadth "addresses the issue of whether 'the statute in question is so
broad that it may not only prohibit unprotected behavior but may also prohibit constitutionally
protected activity as well.' ,! State v. Hall, 905 P.2d 899,901 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State
v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183, 192 (Utah 1987)) (additional quotation omitted); see also
Hoffman, 733 P.2d at 505.
A person claiming overbreadth "bears the burden of demonstrating, 'from the text of
[the law] and from actual fact,1 that substantial overbreadth exists." Virginia v. Hicks, 539
U.S. 113,119,123 S.Ct. 2191, 2198 (2003) (quoting New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City
ofNew York,4&lU.S. 1,14,108 S.Ct. 2225 (1988)). The claimant must demonstrate that the
statute," taken as a whole, is substantially overbroad judged in relation to its plainly legitimate
sweep." Id. (emphasis in original). "In short, there must be a realistic danger that the statute
itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not
before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds." Members of the City
Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801, 104 S.Ct.
2118, 2126 (1984) (emphasis added). Defendant has demonstrated no such danger.
The overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine," in light of the fact that it acts to
invalidate "all enforcement" of a law which otherwise targets "harmful, constitutionally

14

unprotected conduct." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916
(1973); see also Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119, 123 S.Ct. at 2197 (quotation and citation omitted).
"The scope of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, like most exceptions to established
principles, must be carefully tied to the circumstances in which facial invalidation of a statute
is truly warranted." Ferber, 4580J.S. at 769, 102 S. Ct. at 3361. Consequently, "[o]nly a
statute that is substantially overbroad may be invalidated on its face." City of Houston v. Hill,
482 U.S. 451,458,107 S. Ct. 2502,2508 (1987) (citation omitted). It is not enough "that one
can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute[.]" Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. at 800, 104 S.Ct. at 2126. The overbreadth must be real and substantial. See Ashcroft
v. A.C.L.U., 535 U.S. 564, 584, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 1713 (2002) (citingBroadrick, 413 U.S. at
615). This is "particularly [true] where conduct and not merely speech is involved," as is the
case here. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. Therefore, to prevail on an overbreadth claim,
defendant carries a "heavy burden." McConnell v. Federal Election Comm 'n, 540 U.S. 93,
207, 124 S. Ct. 619, 697 (2004). He must demonstrate that "(1) the statute 'reaches a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,' even if the statute also has a
legitimate application, and (2) the statute is not 'readily subject to a narrowing construction.'"
Thompson, 2004 UT 14, f 11 (quoting Hill, 482 U.S. at 458, 107 S. Ct. at 2508, and State v.
Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1983) (other citations omitted)).
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Moreover, courts "afford statutes a strong presumption of constitutionality, and will,
whenever possible, construe a statute so as to save it from constitutional infirmities." I.M.L.
v. State, 2002 UT 110, ^ 25, 61 P.3d 1038 (citations omitted).
R

THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE IS NOT OVERBROAD
WHERE IT REACHES ONLY UNPROTECTED SPEECH
Section 76-10-1801 provides:
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material
omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is
guilty of [communications fraud.]

(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted
were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for
the truth.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) & (7) (1999). This section falls within those statutes that
prohibit "conduct—even if expressive—fall[ing] within the scope of otherwise valid criminal
laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct." See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615, 93 S. Ct. at 2917; see
also Pet. Br. at 21 (recognizing the government's legitimate interest in preventing fraud).
"Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown
extent, there comes a point where that effect—at best a prediction—cannot, with confidence,
justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute
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against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe." Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615,
93 S. Ct. at 2917-18. Such is the case with section 76-10-1801. Indeed, a review of the
statute reveals that there is no overbreadth.
1.

Falsehoods Made Intentionally, Knowingly, or With Reckless
Disregard for the Truth have No First Amendment Protection

The question before this Court is whether the communications fraud statute can
"conceivably be applied" to prohibit constitutionally protected conduct or expression. See
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767, 102 S. Ct. at 3360. Defendant claims it can because the statute is so
broad as to permit a conviction based on a falsehood uttered without an intent to defraud,
thereby "applying] to virtually all intentionally or recklessly uttered falsehoods, regardless
of whether they are fraudulent[.]" Pet. Br. at 20. He further argues that the statute is so broad
as to risk chilling free speech because it has^ '"no core of easily identifiable and
constitutionally proscribable conductf.]"' Pet. Br. at 21-22.
Both arguments fail, however. The statute does not prohibit all falsehoods or material
omissions, but only those that are "made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a
reckless disregard for the truth." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(7). It is this mens rea
element that insulates the communications fraud statute from overbreadth under the First
Amendment because such falsehoods enjoy no First Amendment protection.
The First Amendment affords a measure of protection to "some" falsehoods in order
to provide the breathing space necessary for the exercise offollyprotected speech, or "speech
that matters." BE & K Construction Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516, 531, 122 S. Ct. 2390,
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2399 (2002) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welsh Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-42, 94 S. Ct. 2997
(1974)) (emphasis added in BE & K). Nevertheless, "[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or
otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake." Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1830 (1976);
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339, 94 S. Ct. at 3007 ("[Tjhere is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact"). Consequently, certain classes of speech "ha[ve] never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem." Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,471 72,62 S. Ct. 766,769 (1942). Falsehoods uttered intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless
disregard for their truth fall within one of those unprotected classes. See Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75, 85 S. Ct. 209, 216 (1964); see also I.M.L., 2002 UT 110 at U 13
('"[E]ven where the utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitution which secure
freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences to any except the
knowing or reckless falsehood.'" (quoting Garrison, 379 U.S. at 73, 85 S. Ct. at 215)).
In New York Times, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not permit
civil recovery for a defamatory falsehood unless "the [false] statement was made with 'actual
malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not." 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S. Ct. 710, 726 (1964). The court of appeals here
concluded that because the mens rea requirement for communications fraud is consistent with
that required under New York Times, the statute "cannot be said [to be] 'substantially
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overbroad."' Norris I, 2004 UT App 267, \ 11 (quoting Hill, 482 U.S. at 458, 107 S. Ct. at
2502).
Defendant seeks to limit the holding in New York Times to "its context of civil libel"
and claims that it is inapposite to a criminal fraud situation such as the one present in this
case. Pet. Br. at 19-20. However, defendant fails to acknowledge the United States Supreme
Court's application of New York Times to a criminal context.
The same year New York Times issued, the U.S. Supreme Court issued Garrison v.
Louisiana, in which the Court expressly acknowledged the "differing history and purposes of
criminal libel," and concluded that the New York Times mens rea standard for civil libel cases
applies in the criminal context. See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 67, 85 S. Ct. at 212. Garrison
recognized that "even where [an] utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitution
which securefreedomof expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences to
any except the knowing or reckless" Id. at 73, 85 S. Ct. at 215 (emphasis added). The Court
stated that the reasons which led to the knowing or reckless requirement in New York Times
"apply with no less force merely because the remedy is criminal." Id. at 74, 85 S. Ct. at 21516. The Court then determined that "[t]he constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression
compel application of the same standard to the criminal remedy." Id. at 74, 85 S. Ct at 216.
Although Garrison involved a criminal libel statute, the Supreme Court's analysis
made clear that knowing or reckless falsehoods enjoy no First Amendment protection,
whatever the context. The Court recognized that an inaccurate but honest utterance may
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contribute to the "fruitful exercise of the right of free speech" and warrant protection. Id. at
75, 85 S. Ct. at 216. The Court noted that "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,
and . . . it must be protected [by the First Amendment] if the freedoms of expression are to
have the 'breathing space5 that they 'need . . . to survive[.]'" Id. at 74, 85 S. Ct. at 216
(quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72, 84 S. Ct. at 721).
On the other hand, calculated falsehoods "put a different cast on the constitutional
question" because such falsehoods are "at once at odds with the premises of democratic
government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to
be effected." Id. The Court thus concluded that "[calculated falsehood falls into that class
of utterances which 'are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.'" Id. (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S.
at 572, 62 S. Ct. at 769). "Hence," the Court held, "the knowingly false statement and the
false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional
protection. " Id. (emphasis added); see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339, 94 S. Ct. at 3007.
Garrison controls here. As observed by the Court of Appeals in Norris /, the
communications fraud statute imposes criminal sanctions only where the falsehoods are made
"intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth." 2004 UT App 267, If
11; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (7). Garrison held that even in a criminal setting,
such speech enjoys no First Amendment protections. Accordingly, and regardless of any
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additional element that may define or limit the offense, "it cannot be said that [the
communications statute] is'substantially overbroad'

" Norris /,2004 UT App 267 at \\ 1

(quoting Hill, 482 U.S. at 458, 107 S. Ct. at 2502).
2.

Neither the "Artifice" Nor the "Anything of Value" Provision
Renders the Communications Fraud Statute Overbroad

Defendant's analysis of the communications fraud statute takes issue with the term
"artifice" and the phrase "anything of value." Pet. Br. at 15-19. He argues that the statute's
use of the term "artifice" provides no limitation on the scope of the statute because "an artifice
always underlies any dishonest communication." Id. at 15-16. Similarly, he argues that use
of the phrase "anything of value" encompasses "a virtually limitless array of dishonest
statements or behaviors or omissions." Id. at 16.
He then presents several hypotheses that he claims establish the statute's overbreadth,
arguing that the statute would permit criminal prosecution of an intentional or reckless
falsehood made to increase product sales or votes {id. at 16-17, 20) and an intentional
falsehood made to obtain a date or to prevent embarrassment (id. at 17—lying about one's
weight or political affiliation).
(a)

The Principle That Intentional, Knowing, and
Reckless Falsehoods are Not Protected is
Dispositive

However, the principle that intentional, knowing, and reckless falsehoods are not
protected is dispositive. So long as the falsehoods are made or omissions occur intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly, they are not protected, regardless of the object of the fraud or the
21

subject of the speech. Hence, how the statute limits the object of the fraud is irrelevant.
Whether the object of the fraud is a sale, a vote, a date, or anything of arguable value is
irrelevant because the intentional, knowing or reckless falsehood or omission by which it was
obtained is not protected. Similarly, the nature of the speech as well as the specifics of the
"scheme or artifice" underlying it is irrelevant because the calculated falsehood or omission
removes it from protected speech. See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75, 85 S. Ct. at 216. Absent
protected speech, defendant cannot establish overbreadth. See Hall, 905 P.2d at 901.
In any event, the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech. See
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496-97, 102 S.
Ct. 1186, 1192-93 (1982). Further, the political candidate's statements are not punishable
under the statute because, as this Court has recognized, the question of whether a candidate
misrepresented his position is not capable of objective verification and, hence, cannot form
the basis of a conviction for communications fraud. See West v. Thompson Newspapers, 872
P.2d 999, 1019 (Utah 1994) ("Whether West actually intended to dupe voters into electing
him mayor by misrepresenting his position on municipal power is something only West
himself knows, not something that is subject to objective verification.").
Defendant also argues that the statute would reach a newspaper columnist's sarcastic,
intentional false statement of "opinion" intended to improve newspaper sales or human
behavior, which opinion would amount to a constitutionally-protected political opinion. Pet.
Br. at 16. As with the other hypotheticals, this one does nothing to further defendant's
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overbreadth argument. The fact that the object is a change in human behavior or an increase
in paper sales is irrelevant where the false statements are made intentionally. There is no
federal or state constitutional protection for opinions that make a false assertion of fact. Cf
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705-06 (1990) (neither
false statements nor opinions that imply a false assertion of fact are protected by the First
Amendment); West, 872 P.2d at 1015 (article I, sections 1 and 15 of the state constitution
protect expressions of opinion, but that protection is unavailable when the opinion "states or
implies facts that are false and defamatory"); see also Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147,
1155 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[A] particular statement of opinion may imply a false assertion of fact
and therefore fall outside the scope of the First Amendment's protection as limited by
Milkovich"). The fact that it is a false statement intentionally made removes the statement
from the realm of protected opinion and renders it unprotected speech. See West, 872 P.2d
at 1015.
(b)

In Any Event, Defendant Does Not have
Standing to Challenge the "Anything of Value"
Provision Because He Was Not Convicted of
That Provision

In any event, defendant has no standing to mount a constitutional overbreadth
challenge to the statute's "anything of value" provision. Defendant pled guilty to two counts
of attempted communications fraud. His sworn statement submitted in support of his pleas
provides:
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. . . . The communications supporting the two counts are (1) the newspaper
advertisement run in the spring of 1993; and (2) the in-person meeting with the
victim(s) which culminated with the signing of agreements. The artifice
devised to defraud the victims was to foil their ability to comply with contract
agreements and then sue and obtain judgments against them.
(R. 1822) (emphasis added) (attached in Addendum D). In other words, he was convicted
under the provision of the statute sanctioning afraudulentscheme "to obtain from another
money/' not "anything of value." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). As explained by this
Court in Thompson, a defendant does not have standing to challenge for overbreadth a
provision of the statute which was not applied to the defendant. See Thompson, 2004 UT 14,
ffl[ 12-13,18. This Court should not therefore address his challenge to the "anything of value"
provision.6

6

Defendant includes a separate argument urging this Court to reach his challenge to
the "anything of value" language, noting that the court of appeals refused to do so. Pet.
Br. at 23-25. More specifically, the court of appeals found that defendant lacked standing
to raise a constitutional vagueness challenge to the phrase because his actions did not fall
within the realm of the phrase. Norris II, 2004 UT App 452 at ^ 5 n.3. As explained in
the text of this section, supra, defendant was convicted under the provision relating to
obtaining money, not "anything of value." Hence, the court of appeals properly refused
to reach his vagueness claim. See id,; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7, 102
S. Ct. at 1191 n.7 ("One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully
challenge it for vagueness." (quotations and citation omitted)).
Moreover, this Court did not include defendant's vagueness challenge in its grant
of certiorari review. See Order dated April 19, 2005. Consequently, the State does not
address the issue further.
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POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE FELONY
CHARGES INDEPENDENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT'S
JURISDICTION; ALTERNATIVELY, A VALID ORDER OF
DISMISSAL EXISTED IN THE COURT CASE UPON ISSUANCE OF
THE REMITTITUR, CONCLUDING THE CIRCUIT CASE AND
ALLOWING THE FELONY CHARGES TO BE FILED IN THE
DISTRICT COURT TWO DAYS LATER
This Court has granted certiorari review on the question of the district court's
jurisdiction over a felony information involving charges related to the misdemeanor case and
filed in the district court during the time between issuance and recall of the premature
remittitur in the misdemeanor appeal. See Order dated April 19, 2005. The issue does not
involve any concern about the constitutional or statutory propriety of pursuing related charges
in two different courts because the district court action was stayed pending final resolution
of the misdemeanor appeal (R. 1864: 1-4; R. 1865). The issue is simply the narrow question
of the district court's ability to accept the felony filing while the circuit court case existed.
Because the district court had jurisdiction over the offenses at issue, there was no
jurisdictional bar to the filing of the felony charges in that court.
Should this Court deem the remittitur relevant to this issue, it should turn to the
decision in Chase Manhattan Bank v. Principal Funding Corp,, 2004 UT 9, 89 P.3d 109, for
direction. Based on Chase, the court of appeals determined that under the circumstances at
hand, the appellate judgment dismissing the appeal was self-executing, and, upon issuance
of the remittitur, automatically validated the circuit court's existing order dismissing the
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circuit court case for lack of jurisdiction, and closed that case without further action of the
judge. Norris II, 2004 UT App 267, Yh 8-9. Consequently, there was no barrier to the district
court's acceptance of the felony information two days after issuance of the remittitur in the
circuit court case. Id. at ^f 9. The court of appeals' ruling properly interprets this Court's
detailed explanation of the effect of remittitur in Chase. See Chase Manhattan Bank, 2004
UT9at1fll.
A,

BOTH THE DISTRICT AND THE CIRCUIT COURTS HAD
JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIMINAL CONDUCT
On May 15, 1997—two days after issuance of the premature remittitur in the

misdemeanor appeal—the DA's office filed a felony information in the district court (R. 2-11)
(attached in Addendum E). That information involved twenty third-degree-felony counts of
communications fraud (id). These charges were related to the misdemeanor charges filed
earlier in the circuit court. Each of the counts alleged that "the value of the loss or the thing
sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00" (id.).
Defendant sought to strike the information, filed a motion to dismiss, and submitted
additional documents in the district court (R. 35-80; R. 1864:4; R. 1865: 8). The district
court judge held hearings on defendant's motions, but, upon the subsequent recall of the
remittitur, denied the motions to strike and to dismiss and properly stayed the matter until
completion of the misdemeanor appeal. Cf. Nielson v. Schiller, Judge, et al., 92 Utah 137,66
P.2d 365, 368 (1937) (faced with two cases involving the same parties and the same issues
but filed in two different Utah counties, this Court imposed a stay of proceedings in one court
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pending completion of the proceedings in the other court where jurisdiction was first
acquired).
Defendant argues that the opinion in Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc, v.
Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996), applies in this case to prevent the district
court from obtaining jurisdiction over the felony information because the circuit court in the
misdemeanor case did not reacquire jurisdiction due to the premature issuance of the
remittitur in that case. Pet. Br. at 25-29. He assumes that the inability of the circuit court
judge to act until jurisdiction was properly revested extended to the district court judge as
well, preventing the judge from exercising jurisdiction over the felony information which was
filed while the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. Id.
Defendant provides no authority for his assumption that the district court's jurisdiction
is dependent upon the validity of the circuit court's jurisdiction, and the State has found none.
The fact remains that the district court always had jurisdiction over the felony charges
outlined in the information, and the information was properly filed in that court. See Utah
Code Unann. § 78-3-4 (1995) (at the time the offenses occurred, providing the district court
with original jurisdiction in all criminal matters "not excepted in the Utah Constitution and
not prohibited by law"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999) (providing that the offense is
punishable as "a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained
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or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $ 1,000 but is less than $5,000").7 Thereafter, as of the
July, 1996, consolidation of the circuit and district courts, the district court had jurisdiction
over the charges regardless of their status as felonies or as misdemeanors. See Utah Code
Unann. § 78-1-2(1) (1997) ("Effective July 1, 1996, . . . [t]he district court shall have
jurisdiction as provided by law for the district court and shall have jurisdiction over all matters
filed in the court formerly denominated the circuit court."). Both the court of appeals and the
circuit court judge in this case recognized that the district court had jurisdiction over the
criminal conduct at issue in this matter (R. 0165, 0387-88, 0678-83, 0785).
The timing of the remittitur in the misdemeanor case is a red herring and does not
affect the district court's jurisdiction over the felony information. The mere filing of the
felony charges does not prevent the efficient and effective determination of either case: it is
the pursuit of both cases at the same time that should be avoided. See Nielson, 66 P.2d at 368
(imposing a stay of the proceedings in the second of two cases involving the same issues and
the same parties but filed in different district courts to permit the matter to be decided by the
court first acquiring jurisdiction).

That precaution was taken in this case as soon as the

7

The circuit court itself had jurisdiction over the four class A communications
fraud charges at the time they were filed in that court (R. 621-22) (information attached in
Addendum E). See Utah Code Unann. § 78-4-5 (1995) (outlining the jurisdiction of the
circuit court at the time of the charges at issue and providing for jurisdiction over class A
misdemeanors, most class B misdemeanors, and any misdemeanors related to those
properly before the court); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (providing that the offense is
punishable as a class A misdemeanor "when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000").
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district court judge became aware that the remittitur in the misdemeanor case was premature
(R. 1864: 1-4) (attached in Addendum E).
Accordingly, the district court in this case had jurisdiction to accept and stay the felony
information filed on May 15, 1997.
B,

ALTERNATIVELY, A VALID ORDER OF DISMISSAL EXISTED IN THE
CIRCUIT COURT UPON ISSUANCE OF THE REMITTITUR, CONCLUDING
THAT CASE AND PERMITTING THE FELONY FILING IN DISTRICT
COURT
1.

Remittitur in Utah Generally

"An appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction and transfers it to the appellate court,
where it remains until the trial court regains jurisdiction." Hi-Country Estates, 942 P.2d at
306; see also State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, % 39, 37 P.3d 1073; White v. State, 795 P.2d 648,
649 (Utah 1990) (per curiam). The trial court does not regain jurisdiction "until the appellate
proceeding terminates." Hi-Country Estates, 942 P.2d at 306; see also Chase Manhattan
Bank, 2004 UT 9 at \ 9. The appellate proceeding terminates upon issuance of the remittitur.
See Hi-Country Estates, 942 P.2d at 306; Utah R. App. P. 36.
Utah treats remittitur as a jurisdictional event. "Remittitur is a formal revesting of
jurisdiction with the trial court after appellate proceedings and is governed by the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. Utah R. App. P. 36." Chase Manhattan Bank, 2004 UT 9 at \ 9
("Remittitur is not an order of the appellate court, but merely gives the trial court such
jurisdiction as it needs to implement the appellate court's decision in the matter." (citing 5
C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 968 (1993)) (emphasis added); see also Hi-Country Estates, 942
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P.2d at 306-07. Jurisdiction is returned to the trial court following an appeal only when it
receives the remittitur from the appellate court. See Chase Manhattan Bank 2004 UT 9 at
f 9. Thus, until the appellate court relinquishes appellate jurisdiction, the trial court is
generally prohibited from acting on the case. See id. atfflf9, 12 n.l.
Further, this Court has held that one of the extremely limited situations in which an
appellate court retains jurisdiction to recall a remittitur is where the remittitur issued
prematurely, as occurred here. See Miller v. Southern Pacific Co., 82 Utah 307,24 P.2d 380,
381 (1933). E.g., Hi-Country Estates, 942 P.2d at 306 (court of appeals erred in refusing to
recall premature remittitur). Where a remittitur is prematurely issued, the lower court in the
case has "no jurisdiction to enter a judgment" and any order or modification it enters before
receipt of a valid remittitur is void. Hi-Country Estates, 942 P.2d at 307.
2.

Clarification on Remittitur in Chase

This Court had the opportunity to review its jurisprudence on the effect of remittitur
in this jurisdiction in Chase Manhattan Bank and found it to be "incomplete^". 2004 UT 9
at \ 11. The case involved a quiet title suit between the successor-in-interest of the holder of
a 1994 judgment lien and the successor-in-interest of the holder of a 1996 trust deed on the
same real property. Id. at ^2-5,13. At issue was a court of appeals ruling which purported
to '"vacate the trial court's judgment'" which had been granted in favor of the judgment lien
holder. Id. at \ 2. However, the court of appeals' ruling also stated that the court was
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'"reversing] and remand[ing] for further action consistent with [its] opinion.'" Id. (quoting
England v. Horbach, 905 P.2d 3015 302 n.l, 305 (Utah App. 1995)).
This Court determined that resolution of the case rested on the effect of the court of
appeals' ruling and the related remittitur. Id. at f 7. This Court explained that if the appellate
ruling was self-executing and vacated the trial court's judgment, then the 1994 judgment lien
would have been dissolved when the property was sold following default on the 1996 trust
deed, even though the case was on certiorari review at the time the trust deed issued. Id. at
fflf 2, 7. However, if the ruling was not self-executing, the judgment lien would have
remained effective until, upon remittitur and the revesting ofjurisdiction, the trial court acted
to implement the ruling. Id. If the trial court failed to act before this Court granted certiorari,
the judgment lien would have remained effective and would be superior to the 1996 trust
deed. Id.
This Court first acknowledged its own precedent announcing that the judgment of an
appellate court is not self-executing, but is "'remitted back to the courtfromwhich the appeal
was taken[] for execution of the judgment.'" Id. at *\ 11 (quoting State v. Johnson, 100 Utah
316, 114 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1941)). The Court then explained that, generally, appellate
judgments which reverse or qualifiedly affirm a lower court ruling "will almost always require
further action by the trial court." Id. at If 12. In those cases, the appellate court's
determination that the lower court ruling should be vacated or dismissed "represent
expressions of the appellate opinion to be read as the law of the case upon the revesting of
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jurisdiction in the trial court by remittitur." Id, (quoting Puritan Leasing Co, v. Superior
Court of Santa Barbara County, 16 Cal.App.3d 140,142 Cal.Rptr. 676,679-80 (1977)). The
trial court must, therefore, affirmatively act in a manner which effectuates the appellate
judgment.
However, the Court also determined that many appellate court judgments are, in fact,
self-executing. Chase Manhattan Bank, 2004 UT 9 at \ 12. Those include an unqualified
affirmance of the lower court judgment as well as a reversal or qualified affirmance about
which the appellate court expressly invokes its constitutional or statutory power "to fully and
finally dispose of the matter." Id. (citing Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 3 and Utah Code Ann. § 7821-3(l)(a) (2002)). In other words, when an appellate court simply affirms the judgment or
specifically notes that "no further action is required by the trial court," the judgment is selfexecuting, even if it reverses or qualifiedly affirms the lower court's ruling. Id, These orders
are self-executing because "no further order is needed from the trial court. . . . [T]he trial
court's original order merely remains intact. As a result, the trial court need not act for a valid
order to be found in the record." Id, at ^ 12 (citation omitted).
The Court's review of the "implications of remittitur" and its recognition of the selfexecuting nature of some appellate decisions was possible because the appellate decision at
issue was rendered under the old version of rule 36, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which
governed remittiturs. Id. at f 9. The self-executing nature of the appellate judgment would
not have become an issue under the current version of the rule because, upon the filing of a
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petition for writ of certiorari, the appellate judgment would automatically be stayed. Id.; Utah
R. App. P. 36. The old version of the rule, however, permitted a party "to request a stay of
the issuance of remittitur to prevent further action by the trial court while the party's petition
for writ of certiorari was pending." Id. Because neither party stayed issuance of the remittitur
and such a stay was not automatic at that time, this Court was required to look into the selfexecuting nature of the appellate judgment to determine what effect that judgment had on the
lower court upon issuance of the remittitur. Chase Manhattan Bank, 2004 UT 9 at \ 9. In
other words, the issuance of the remittitur not only provides the trial court with the jurisdiction
needed to implement a non-self-executing appellate decision, but it automatically activates
a self-executing appellate decision. Id. at *|ffi 7, 9, 12.
Consequently, under former rule 36(a)(3), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an
appellate court's self-executing judgment automatically validates the final order on record in
the trial court, without further involvement of the lower court, upon remittitur of the case,
absent any timely request for a stay of the remittitur. It is the former rule which applies in this
case.
3.

Under Chase, the Appellate Order was Self-Executing and
Validated the Circuit Court's Order of Dismissal

In this case, the State sought voluntary dismissal of its misdemeanor appeal, and the
court of appeals entered an order of dismissal (R. 0201-02, 0394, 0742, 0788-89). Add. F.
Defendant failed to seek a stay of the remittitur before filing his cert petition to prevent any
action from occurring in the circuit court from which the misdemeanor appeal arose. The
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remittitur, however, issued prematurely. Under Chase Manhattan Bank the remittitur would
prevent implementation of a non-self-executing appellate judgment because it would not
transfer the jurisdiction necessary to effect implementation. See Chase Manhattan Bank, 2004
UT 9 at 112. However, this case involves a self-executing judgment, and the court of appeals
properly interpreted Chase as providing that such a judgment becomes effective upon issuance
of the remittitur. See Norris II, 2004 UT App 452 atffif8-9. Moreover, because a remittitur
merely confers such jurisdiction as it necessary to implement the appellate decision, and no
active implementation was required here, the premature issuance of the remittitur did not stay
the self-execution of the appellate decision. Cf. Chase Manhattan Bank, 2004 UT 9 at ^j 12.
(a)

The Court of Appeals' Judgment was SelfExecuting, Requiring no Further Action by the
Circuit Court

The court of appeals' order in this case provided:
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion to stay
[the appellate order "directing him to file a response to the motion to dismiss"
by a date certain] is denied and this appeal is dismissed.
(R. 0785) (attached in Addendum F). This order is indistinguishable fiom the affirmance of
a trial court's judgment which this Court discussed in Chase. It clearly and unequivocally
dismissed the appeal without the need for any additional action on the part of the circuit court
and left the circuit court's dismissal order intact. See Chase Manhattan Bank, 2004 UT 9 at
If 12. Not only is there no circuit court action required to implement the self-executing
decision in this case, but there is no post-appeal disposition of any sort to be had. See Utah
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R. Crim P. 28 (outlining affirmative acts required by lower court following an appellate
disposition). Hence, the self-executing appellate order becomes folly effective without any
act whatsoever at the circuit court level.
Consequently, it was self-executing and "le[ft] the parties in the position they were in
before the appeal was brought." 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appellate Review § 877 (2005).
(b)

The Remittitur Permitted the Appellate
Judgment to Execute, Validating the Circuit
Court Dismissal Order and Ending the Case

Under Chase Manhattan Bank, had the remittitur issued timely, there would be no
question but that the circuit court's order of dismissal was validated and would not have
barred the filing of felony charges in district court. See 2004 UT 9 at ^ 7-12. The simple
fact that the remittitur issued prematurely does not act to prevent the self-executing appellate
judgmentfromtaking effect under the circumstances of this case. Cf. Hi-Country Estates, 942
P.2d at 306-07 (recognizing the distinction between the vesting in the lower court of
jurisdiction to actively implement a non-self-executing appellate decision and preventing or
staying execution of an appellate decision).
In this case, the issue is, in essence, whether a premature remittitur can effectively stay
a self-executing appellate judgment. A remittitur is not an order of the appellate court: it
simply formally revests in the lower court only that jurisdiction needed to implement the
appellate court's decision. See Chase Manhattan Bank, 2004 UT 9 at \ 9. While a premature
remittitur does not permit further action by the lower court with respect to the appellate
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decision, it does nothing to prevent the self-execution of a judgment already made by the
appellate court, especially where that judgment requires no circuit court action to become
effective. To hold otherwise would be to elevate a premature remittitur to the position of a
stay of execution without any basis for doing so.
Here, the appeal was voluntarily dismissed. See Utah R. App. P. 37. A voluntary
dismissal "le[aves] the judgment of the circuit court in full force and effect, the same as if no
appeal had ever been taken." People ex rel Waite v. Bristow, 391 111. 101, 62 N.E.2d 545,
551 (1945). The parties are left in the position they were in before the appeal was brought.
See 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appellate Review § 877. The timing of the remittitur does not change the
nature of the dismissal.
Defendant relies on Hi-Country Estates, arguing that the existence of a premature
remittitur nullifies "all actions of a trial court" and prevented district court jurisdiction. Pet.
Br. at 27-28. However, that reliance is misplaced. The appellate order in that case was not
self-executing. Instead, it was a qualified order of reversal requiring action by the trial court
upon remittitur, which action the trial court never obtained jurisdiction to take because the
remittitur issued prematurely. 942 P.2d at 306. Consequently, the trial court's attempt to
implement the appellate decision by modifying the judgment which was the subject of the
appeal was rendered null and void. Id. Moreover, the concerns noted in Hi-Country Estates
were those resulting from violation of "the rule prohibiting the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction in a case while it is on appeal." Id. at 307. That rule was neither violated nor at
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issue in this case. Finally, Hi-Country Estates spoke only to the jurisdiction of the lower
court from which the appeal came, not to the jurisdiction of other courts. The court of appeals
properly rejected defendant's reliance on Hi-Country Estates. See Norris II, 2004 UT App.
452 at 1| 7.
Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the remittitur, whether premature
or timely, simply provides the method by which the lower court is notified of the selfexecuting appellate decision and by which the record is returned. There is nothing in the
timing of the remittitur which would prevent the self-execution of the appellate decision at
issue here.
C

DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE FILING OF INFORMATIONS
BEFORE MULTIPLE DISTRICT COURT JUDGES VIOLATED THE
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION DOCTRINE IS OUTSIDE THE
SCOPE OF THIS COURT'S GRANT OF CERTIORARI
Defendant's second point includes an argument that "the refiling [of felony charges]

before multiple district court judges" violated the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine. Pet. Br.
at 28-29. The State does not address this claim because the Court did not grant certiorari on
this issue.
The law is well-settled that this Court will review on certiorari "'[o]nly the questions
set forth in the petition or fairly included therein5 and for which certiorari is granted." DeBry
v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,443 (Utah 1995) (quoting Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4)). In his petition,
as well as in his brief, defendant included this argument at the end of his argument that the
premature remittitur prevented the district court from acquiring subject matter jurisdiction
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over this case. See Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at 19-20; Pet. Br. at 28-29. This Court's grant
of certiorari on the remittitur issue did not include the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine.
Instead, the Court granted certiorari on the issue of:

2.

Whether the district court had jurisdiction over felony charges filed after
remittitur in the related misdemeanor case but before the remittitur was
recalled.

The second issue shall not be deemed to include the allegations relating
to due process, prosecutorial vindictiveness, or any other matter set forth in the
third question presented by the petition.
See Order dated April 19, 2005. Accordingly, this Court did not grant certiorari on the
concurrent jurisdiction issue. Defendant is thus precluded from raising the issue on certiorari.
Moreover, defendant makes no attempt to argue that there is any overlap in this issue
and the issue identified in this Court's grant of certiorari review upon which one could fairly
be said to include the other. He simply points generally to the "filing of the successive
prosecutions" which occurred while the misdemeanor case was on appeal and mentions by
case number two district court cases. Pet. Br. at 28-29.
This Court should not, therefore, address defendant's concurrent jurisdiction claim
because it is outside the scope of certiorari—the Court did not grant certiorari on the claim,
and it is not fairly included in the question of the self-executing nature of the appellate court's
dismissal of the misdemeanor appeal.

38

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
court of appeals' ruling in all respects.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5 > c l a y of July, 2005.
MARK SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

7

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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day of July, 2005.
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Before Judges
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BILLINGS,

BENCH,

and

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
*1 Defendant Richard F. Norris appeals his
conviction of attempted communications fraud. See
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 to 76-10-1801 (1997).
We affirm.
In December 1994, West Valley City (West
Valley) charged Defendant with four misdemeanor
counts of communications fraud in the Third Circuit
Court, West Valley Department. [FN1] See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (1994). In February
1996, the circuit court dismissed the misdemeanor
charges, ruling that the aggregate of the four
misdemeanor counts exceeded the circuit court's
jurisdictional limit of $1000.00. West Valley

On December 10, 1996, because the State was
prepared to file felony counts of communications
fraud against Defendant in district court, West
Valley moved this court to dismiss its appeal. On
March 26, 1997, this court dismissed the appeal,
and on May 13, 1997, this court issued a remittitur.
Two days later, the State filed twenty felony
charges of communications fraud against Defendant
in district court.
Defendant moved to recall the remittitur on the
ground that it had been issued prematurely because
Defendant's time to file a petition for certiorari had
not expired. On June 26, 1997, the Utah Supreme
Court ordered this court to recall the remittitur,
which this court did on June 30, 1997. On
September 26, 1997, Defendant moved the district
court to dismiss the felony charges because the
West Valley case was still active. The district court
did not dismiss the charges, but rather stayed its
proceedings until all activity in the West Valley
appeal had ceased.
After Defendant's petitions for certiorari had been
denied in both the Utah Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court, this court reissued the
remittitur on October 30, 1998. Defendant then
moved the district court to dismiss the felony
charges, claiming that (i) the communications fraud
statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad,
and (ii) the district court lacked jurisdiction over the
May 1997 felony charges because the May 1997
remittitur was subsequently recalled. The district
court denied the motions.
Defendant then entered a conditional plea in which
Defendant preserved his right to challenge the
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constitutionality of the
statute and the jurisdiction
hear the felony charges
Defendant appeals these two

communications fraud
of the district court to
filed in May 1997.
issues. [FN2]

FN2.
Defendant
attempts
to
raise
numerous other issues in his briefs. We do
not address these issues because they
exceed the scope of what was preserved in
the conditional plea. Defendant mentions
plain error in a single paragraph, but fails
to apply plain error doctrine to any of the
specific issues raised. Thus, we do not
address Defendant's plain error argument
because it is inadequately briefed. See
Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(5)(B) ("The brief of
the appellant shall contain ... a statement of
grounds for seeking review of an issue not
preserved in the trial court.").
Defendant argues that the statute under which he
was charged is unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. However, after this appeal was filed, this
court addressed these specific challenges. See State
v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267,ffl 8-16, 97 P.3d 732
(holding that the communications fraud statute is
neither
unconstitutionally
overbroad
nor
unconstitutionally
vague).
Thus,
Defendant's
constitutional challenges to the communications
fraud statute fail. [FN3]
FN3. Defendant claims that our prior
decision did not directly deal with the
phrase "anything of value," and thus we
are free to hold that the statute is
unconstitutionally vague on that basis.
However, our prior decision did hold that
"because Defendant was charged with
devising a scheme to defraud others of
money, his actions do not fall within the
anything of value realm, and thus, he may
not
challenge
this
phrase
as
unconstitutionally vague." State v. Norris,
2004 UT App 267,1 15, 97 P.3d 732
(quotations and citations omitted). In this
case, Defendant also was charged with
devising a scheme to defraud others of
money, and thus under the rule articulated

in Norris, Defendant also may not
challenge this phrase as unconstitutionally
vague in this case. See id.
In addition, Defendant's challenge to the
State charging multiple counts when one
communication reaches numerous victims
already has been decided by this court. See
State v. Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, 99
P.3d 359.
Defendant also challenges the jurisdiction of the
trial court to hear the felony charges filed in May
1997. Specifically, Defendant argues that even
though this court had issued a remittitur in the West
Valley appeal before the felony charges were filed,
the remittitur had no effect because it was
subsequently recalled. We disagree.
*2 "The determination of whether a court has
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law,
which we review for correctness, according no
deference to the district court's determination."
Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,f 8, 31
P.3d 1147. The issue in this case is whether a valid
order dismissing the misdemeanor charges in the
West Valley case existed at the time felony charges
were filed. The parties focus their arguments on
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n. v. Foothills
Water Co., 942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996), which held
that actions taken by a trial court after a remittitur
issues are void if the remittitur is subsequently
recalled. See id. at 307. Hi-Country, however, does
not control the outcome of this case.
The controlling case is Chase Manhattan Bank v.
Principal Funding Corp., 2004 UT 9, 89 P.3d 109.
[FN4] In Chase Manhattan, the court outlined the
situations in which judgments by appellate courts
are self-executing. See id. at ^ 11. The court
concluded that, under the 1997 version of rule 36 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, where "the
trial court need not act for a valid order to be found
in the record," the judgment is self-executing unless
a party specifically requests and is granted a stay of
the remittitur before it issues. [FN5] Id. at f 12.
Specifically, the court held that if a judgment by
this court is self-executing, then a valid order exists
on the record from the moment the remittitur is
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issued until it is subsequently recalled. See id. at If
7.
FN4. The State cites Nielson v. Schiller, 92
Utah 137, 66 P.2d 365 (1937), a civil case,
for the proposition that a second-filed
action should be stayed until the first-filed
action has been resolved. See id. at 368.
Because that case did not involve a
remittitur, or even an appeal, it does not
speak directly to the jurisdictional issue in
this case. Rather, it merely indicates that in
this case it was proper for the district court
to issue a stay once it was aware that the
appeal had been resuscitated.
FN5. The current rule avoids the odd
situation in this case by providing that a
remittitur issues immediately after the time
for filing a petition for certiorari has
expired, unless such a petition is filed, in
which case the remittitur is automatically
stayed. See Utah R.App. P. 36(a)(2).

Blackledge, the record in this case does not
indicate a "realistic likelihood of
'vindictiveness,' " id. at 27, because (i) the
original trial court dismissed the
misdemeanor charges sua sponte, (ii) the
appeal was taken by West Valley, not the
Defendant, (iii) the State indicated its
intention to file felony charges prior to
Defendant asking the Utah Supreme Court
to recall the appeal, and (iv) the State had
a legitimate reason to file felony charges
when it did, namely concern over the
statute of limitations. While the State's
actions in this case were less than ideal, the
record does not come close to establishing
prosecutorial vindictiveness in response to
Defendant exercising his procedural rights
on appeal.
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Associate
Presiding Judge and NORMAN H. JACKSON,
Judge.
2004 WL 2749484 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 452

In the West Valley appeal, acting on a motion by
the appellant, this court dismissed the appeal.
Dismissal of the West Valley appeal required no
further action by the circuit court, but rather left in
place the circuit court's ruling that dismissed the
misdemeanor charges without prejudice. Thus,
when the State filed felony charges in district court
two days after this court issued a remittitur, no
further action was required in the West Valley case.
Therefore, a valid judgment existed on the record
when felony charges were filed. The subsequent
recall of the remittitur on Defendant's motion did
not change this fact. See id. at lfl[ 12-13. For this
reason, the district court did not lack jurisdiction
when charges were filed in this case. [FN6]
Therefore, we affirm.

END OF DOCUMENT

FN6. Defendant claims that his due
process rights were violated when the State
vindictively prosecuted the felony case
against him, and thus under Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), the due process
violations strip the district court of
jurisdiction.
However,
unlike
in
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
*i Chapter 10. Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, Welfare, and Morals
*i! Part 18. Communications Fraud
-f§ 76-10-1801. Communications

fraud—Elements—Penalties

(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to
obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who
communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose
of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the
obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300;

property,

money,

or

thing

(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property,
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and

money,

or

thing

(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud
is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought
to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as
provided in Subsection (1)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense
described in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of
value is not a necessary element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of
communication fraud.
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection

(1) means to bestow, convey, make
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known, recount, impart; to give by way of
transmit information.

information; to talk

over; or to

(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail,
telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and
written communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or
omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.
Laws 1985, c. 157, § 2; Laws 1990, c. 79, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 29L, § 24, eff. May
1, 1995.
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Richard NORRIS, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20020966-CA.
Aug. 12, 2004.
Background:
unconditional
Court, Provo
three counts
appealed.

Defendant was convicted on his
pleas of guilty in the Fourth District
Department, James R. Taylor, J., of
of communications fraud, and he

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, James Z. Davis,
J., held that:
(1) defendant's unconditional guilty plea to
communications fraud did not operate as waiver of
his
facial
constitutional
challenge
to
communications fraud statute;
(2) communications fraud statute was not
unconstitutionally overbroad;
(3) term "artifice" as used in communications
fraud statute was not unconstitutionally vague; and
(4)
term
"communicate"
as
used
in
communications
fraud
statute,
was
not
unconstitutionally vague.
Affirmed.

[2] Criminal Law €=>1134(3)
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases
Constitutional challenges to statutes present
questions of law, which the appellate court reviews
for correctness.
[3] Constitutional Law €=>48(1)
92k48(l) Most Cited Cases
[3] Constitutional Law €=^48(3)
92k48(3) Most Cited Cases
When addressing a challenge to the constitutionality
of a statute, the appellate court presumes that the
statute is valid and resolves any reasonable doubts
in favor of constitutionality.
[4] Criminal Law €==>273.4(1)
110k273.4(l) Most Cited Cases
Defendant's
unconditional
guilty
plea to
communications fraud did not operate as waiver of
his
facial
constitutional
challenge
to
communications fraud statute, as such challenge
was jurisdictional in nature; defendant's facial
challenge to constitutionality of statute directly cut
to power and authority of court to determine a
controversy, and thus was necessarily a
jurisdictional matter. U.C.A.1953, 76-10-1801.
[5] Criminal Law €=^273.3
110k273.3 Most Cited Cases

Gregory K. Orme, J., filed concurring opinion.
Russell W. Bench, Associate P.J., filed opinion
concurring in result.
West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law €==n 134(3)
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases
The determination of whether a court has subject
matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which an
appellate court reviews for correctness.

[5] Criminal Law €=^>273.4(1)
110k273.4(l) Most Cited Cases
The general rule applicable in criminal proceedings
is that by pleading guilty, defendant is deemed to
have admitted all of the essential elements of the
crime charged and thereby waives all
nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea
constitutional violations.
[6] Courts €==>4
106k4 Most Cited Cases
"Subject matter jurisdiction" is the power and
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authority of the court to determine a controversy
and without which it cannot proceed.
[7] Criminal Law €=>105
110k 105 Most Cited Cases
Subject matter jurisdiction can neither be waived
nor conferred by consent of the accused in a
criminal proceeding; objection to the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter may be urged at
any stage of the proceedings, and the right to make
such an objection is never waived.
[8] Criminal Law €==>1017
110kl017 Most Cited Cases
When subject matter jurisdiction is an issue, it is the
duty of the appellate court to satisfy itself not only
of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower
courts in a cause under review.
[9] Criminal Law €^273.4(1)
110k273.4(l) Most Cited Cases
[9] Criminal Law €=>1026.10(4)
110kl026.10(4) Most Cited Cases
In general, a plea of guilty waives all
nonjurisdictional defects, but does not bar appeal of
claims that the applicable statute is unconstitutional
or that the indictment fails to state an offense.
[10] Criminal Law €^273.4(1)
110k273.4(l) Most Cited Cases
[10] Criminal Law €^1026.10(4)
110kl026.10(4) Most Cited Cases
Although a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional
defects and fact issues, a vagueness challenge to a
statute is a jurisdictional defect thus, following a
guilty plea, defendant could raise on appeal that he
was prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute.
[11] Criminal Law €=^13(1)
110kl3(l) Most Cited Cases
In considering whether a statute is overbroad, a
court's first task is to determine whether the
enactment reaches a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct.
[12] Criminal Law €^13(1)

110kl3(l) Most Cited Cases
Courts examine criminal statutes with particular
care; those that make unlawful a substantial amount
of constitutionally protected conduct may be held
facially invalid even if they also have legitimate
application.
[13] Criminal Law €=^13(1)
110kl3(l) Most Cited Cases
Only a statute that is substantially overbroad may be
invalidated on its face; overbreadth must not only
be real, but substantial as well.
[14] False Pretenses €=^2
170k2 Most Cited Cases
[14] Fraud €^68
184k68 Most Cited Cases
Communications fraud statute, which prohibited
devising any scheme or artifice to defraud another
or to obtain from another money, property, or
anything of value by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, promises, or material
omissions, was not unconstitutionally overbroad;
statute did not prohibit all false pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions,
only those where individual sought to defraud
another or to obtain from another money, property,
or anything of value, and statute required proof that
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
promises, or material omissions made or omitted
were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or
with a reckless disregard for the truth. U.C.A.1953,
76-10-1801(1,7).
[15] Statutes €=>188
361kl88 Most Cited Cases
[15] Statutes €=>212.6
361k212.6 Most Cited Cases
When interpreting the challenged language of a
statute, courts look to the statute's plain language
and presume that the legislature used each term
advisedly.
[16] Criminal Law €^13(1)
110kl3(l) Most Cited Cases
Statutory language is overbroad if its language
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proscribes both harmful and innocuous behavior.
[17] Constitutional Law €=^90(3)
92k90(3) Most Cited Cases
While the First Amendment may value some
falsehoods for their contribution to public debate, it
has not given protection to malicious statements
that were made with knowledge that they were false
or with reckless disregard of whether they were
false or not. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
[18] Criminal Law €^13.1(1)
110kl3.1(l) Most Cited Cases
The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a
statute or ordinance define an offense with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.
[19] Criminal Law €=^13.1(1)
110kl3.1(l) Most Cited Cases
If a statute challenged on vagueness grounds
implicates no constitutionally protected conduct,
individual challenging statute must show that the
statute is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications.
[20] False Pretenses €^=>2
170k2 Most Cited Cases
[20] Fraud €=^68
184k68 Most Cited Cases
Term "artifice" as used in communications fraud
statute, which prohibited devising any scheme or
artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another
money, property, or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
promises, or material omissions, was not
unconstitutionally vague; "artifice" was commonly
understood to mean "an artful stratagem," or a
"trick," statute did not prohibit all stratagems or
tricks, only those meant to defraud others, and while
the term "artifice" could be construed broadly, this,
in itself, did not render statute vague. U.C.A.1953,
76-10-1801(1).
[21] Statutes €==>208

361k208 Most Cited Cases
Courts, in construing a statute, do not read a
statutory term in a vacuum, but, rather as the term
relates to the other terms within the statute.
[22] Criminal Law €^13.1(1)
110kl3.1(l) Most Cited Cases
A statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it
is broad.
[23] False Pretenses €==>2
170k2 Most Cited Cases
Term "communicate" as used in communications
fraud statute, which prohibited communicating
directly or indirectly with any person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the
scheme or artifice, was not unconstitutionally
vague; although the term "communicate" was
broadly defined in statute, this, in itself, did not
render term vague, statute did not seek to punish
those who kept artifice or scheme to themselves,
and there had been no showing that ordinary people
could not understand what conduct was prohibited.
U.C.A.1953,76-10-1801(1), (6)(a).
[24] False Pretenses €=?2
170k2 Most Cited Cases
Conduct for which defendant was charged under
communications fraud statute, which was devising
scheme to defraud others of "money," did not fall
under ambit of depriving others of "anything of
value," and thus defendant could not mount
vagueness challenge to statute on basis that phrase
"anything of value," as used in statute was
unconstitutionally vague; vast majority of
communications
fraud
statute's
intended
applications would involve incidents where
individuals had defrauded others of "money" or
"property," both of which terms were sufficiently
understood to allow ordinary citizens to determine
what conduct statute prohibited. U.C.A.1953,
76-10-1801(1).
[25] Criminal Law €^13.1(1)
110kl3.1(l) Most Cited Cases
Speculation about possible vagueness in
hypothetical situations not before the court will not
support a facial attack on a statute when it is surely
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valid in
the vast majority of its intended applications.
*735 J ennifer K. Gowans, Fillmore Spencer LLC,
Provo, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and Jeffrey S.
Gray, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee.
Before BENCH, Associate P.J., and DAVIS and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
DAVIS, Judge:
**1 After entering an unconditional, voluntary
guilty plea to three counts of communications fraud,
Richard Norris (Defendant)
challenges the
constitutionality of the underlying statute (the
communications fraud statute) on appeal. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2003). [FN1] We affirm.
FN1. Because the communications fraud
statute has not changed since Defendant
was charged, we cite to the most current
version for convenience.
BACKGROUND
**2 Defendant was charged with seven counts of
communications fraud and was bound over on all
counts. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2003).
After several days of trial, Defendant entered an
unconditional, voluntary guilty plea to three counts
of third-degree-felony communications fraud. See
id § 76-10-1801(l)(c). After sentencing, and
without moving to withdraw his guilty pleas,
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, mounting
a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the
communications fraud statute on overbreadth and
vagueness grounds.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1][2][3] **3 We consider two issues on appeal.
First, we must determine whether this court has
subject matter jurisdiction to consider Defendant's
constitutional challenge after Defendant entered an
unconditional, voluntary
guilty
plea.
"The

determination of whether a court has subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review
for correctness...." Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc.,
2001 UT 81,H 8, 31 P.3d 1147. Second, if this
court has jurisdiction, then we must consider
whether the communications fraud statute is
unconstitutionally overbroad or vague on its face.
"Constitutional challenges to statutes present
questions of law, which we review for correctness."
Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14,H 5,
86 P.3d 735. "When addressing such a challenge,
this court presumes that the statute is valid, and we
resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality." State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24,f 6,
980P.2dl91.
ANALYSIS
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
[4][5] **4 "The general rule applicable in criminal
proceedings ... is that by pleading guilty, the
defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the
essential elements of the *736 crime charged and
thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects,
including
alleged
pre-plea
constitutional
violations." State v. Parsom, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278
(Utah 1989); see also State v. Hardy, 2002 UT
App 244,f 13, 54 P.3d 645. The State asserts that
Defendant's facial challenge to the constitutionality
of the communications fraud statute falls within the
ambit of the "pre-plea constitutional violations"
mentioned in Parsons. 781 P.2d at 1278.
Therefore, the State argues that because Defendant's
challenge is nonjurisdictional in nature, it was
waived by his guilty plea. Defendant asserts that
"pre-plea constitutional violations," id, encompass
violations involving such things as Miranda
admonitions and search warrants, and that a facial
constitutional challenge to a statute is, at its heart, a
jurisdictional issue. Therefore, Defendant argues
that his challenge was not waived by his guilty plea.
[6][7][8] **5 "Subject matter jurisdiction is the
power and authority of the court to determine a
controversy and without which it cannot proceed."
Thompson v. Jackson, lA'i P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah
Ct.App.1987) (per curiam). Subject matter
jurisdiction "can neither be waived nor conferred by
consent of the accused. Objection to the
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jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter may
be urged at any stage of the proceedings, and the
right to make such an objection is never waived."
James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah
Ct.App.1998) (quotations and citations omitted).
When subject matter jurisdiction is an issue, "[i]t is
the duty of this court to 'satisfy itself not only of its
own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in
a cause under review.1 " EEOC v. Chicago Club, 86
F.3d 1423, 1428 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting Mitchell v.
Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244, 55 S.Ct. 162, 79 L.Ed.
338 (1934)). [FN2]
FN2. Instead of focusing on whether
subject matter jurisdiction exists in a
particular context, Judge Bench relies on
Utah
cases
generally
describing
jurisdiction of our courts of general
jurisdiction. The issue squarely presented
in this case has not been addressed by Utah
courts.
Our jurisprudence, however, is no stranger
to the concept that a court with general
jurisdiction over a particular claim may or
may not have subject matter jurisdiction
over that claim. Although not directly
analogous to the case at bar, perhaps the
best example involves claims against
governmental entities. There is no
question that courts of general jurisdiction
in Utah have jurisdiction over those
claims. This notwithstanding, however,
Utah appellate decisions have repeatedly
held that the failure to strictly comply with
the statutory requirements for claims
against governmental entities deprives
those courts of subject matter jurisdiction
over such claims. See, e.g., Greene v.
Utah Transit Auth, 2001 UT 109,ffi[
16-17, 37 P.3d 1156; Security Inv. Ltd. v.
Brown, 2002 UT App 131,K 13, 47 P.3d
97.
[9][10] **6 "In general, a plea of guilty waives all
nonjurisdictional defects, but does not bar appeal of
claims that the applicable statute is unconstitutional
or that the indictment fails to state an offense."
United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262 n.

1 (9th Cir.1979). "Although a guilty plea waives all
non[ ljurisdictional defects and fact issues, a
vagueness challenge is a jurisdictional defect.
Thus, following a guilty plea, a defendant could
raise on appeal that he was prosecuted under an
unconstitutional statute." United States v. Skinner,
25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir.1994) (quotations and
citation omitted); see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S.
61, 62 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975)
(per curiam) ("We simply hold that a plea of guilty
to a charge does not waive a claim that— judged on
its face-the charge is one which the State may not
constitutionally prosecute."); Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 21, 30-31, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628
(1974) (holding that guilty plea did not preclude the
defendant from raising his constitutional claims
because they "went to the very power of the State to
bring the defendant into court to answer the charge
brought against him"); United States v. Whited, 311
F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir.2002) (addressing defendant's
claim
that
the
underlying
statute
was
unconstitutional because it "properly f[e]ll within
the narrow scope of review not barred by a guilty
plea"), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1065, 123 S.Ct. 2234,
155 L.Ed.2d 1121 (2003); United States v. Morgan,
230 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir.2000) (recognizing
that a claim that a statute is facially unconstitutional
is a jurisdictional claim not waived by a guilty
plea); United States v. McKenzie, 99 F.3d 813, 816
(7th Cir.1996) (addressing defendant's argument on
appeal after his guilty plea because he made "the
only argument *737 available to him by asserting a
jurisdictional
challenge
based
on
the
constitutionality of the underlying statute"); United
States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 885 n. 1 (7th
Cir.1996) ("[The defendant] entered his guilty plea
without preserving his constitutional challenge[ to
the underlying statute] for appeal. However, the
government has expressly declined to raise a waivei
argument, citing United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495,
496-97
(7th
Cir.1995)
(challenge
to
constitutionality of statute of conviction is, in
certain circumstances, jurisdictional claim nol
waived by guilty plea)."); Bell, 70 F.3d at 496-97
(addressing
defendant's
challenge
to
the
constitutionality of the underlying statute after
recognizing the principle that such a challenge "is a
jurisdictional claim which is not waived by the

© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

97 P.3d 732

Page 6

97 P.3d 732, 506 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 UT App 267
(Cite as: 97 P.3d 732,2004 UT App 267)
guilty plea"); United States v. Palacios-Casquete,
55 F.3d 557, 561 (11th Cir.1995) ("A guilty plea ...
does not waive the right of an accused to challenge
the constitutionality of the statute under which he is
convicted."); Mariano v. Kincheloe, 915 F.2d 549,
552 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that the defendant "did
not waive his constitutional attack on the
[underlying] statute by pleading guilty"); United
States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir.1989)
(stating that although the dividing line between
constitutional claims that are waived by a guilty
plea and those that survive the plea is not
"crystal-clear," "[c]laims that 'the applicable statute
is unconstitutional or that the indictment fails to
state an offense' are jurisdictional claims not waived
by the guilty plea" (quoting Broncheau, 597 F.2d at
1262 n. 1)), amended by 907 F.2d 115 (9th
Cir.1990); United States v. Barboa, 111 F.2d 1420,
1423 n. 3 (10th Cir.1985) ("A plea of guilty ... does
not bar a claim that the defendant may not
constitutionally be convicted in the first instance....
If [the defendant] plefaded] guilty to something
which was not a crime, he is not now precluded
from raising this jurisdictional defect, which goes
'to the very power of the State to bring the
defendant into court to answer the charge brought
against him.' " (quoting Blackledge, 411 U.S. at 30,
94 S.Ct. 2098)); United States v. Hill, 564 F.2d
1179, 1180 (5th Cir.1977) (per curiam)
(recognizing that "a guilty plea does not bar an
appeal that asserts that ... the charge is
unconstitutional"); United States v. Tallant, 547
F.2d 1291, 1295 n. 5 (5th Cir.1977) (recognizing
that a claim based upon "the unconstitutionality of
the statute underlying the indictment" was an
"appealable issue[ ] following a ... guilty plea");
United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 978 n. 8 (5th
Cir.1975) (recognizing "that after entering ... a plea
of guilty, a defendant may only appeal jurisdictional
defects in the proceeding below, such as ... the
unconstitutionality of the statute underlying the
indictment"); Mercado v. Rockefeller, 502 F.2d
666, 672 (2d Cir.1974) ("[I]t is clear that [a] guilty
plea waives only nonjurisdictional defects and does
not waive the right to contest the constitutionality of
the statute that is the basis for a conviction."
(second alteration in original) (quotations and
citation omitted)); United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d

937, 941 (6th Cir.1972) (recognizing that "[a]
defendant who has pleaded guilty is not barred from
claiming ... that the statute under which he was
charged is unconstitutional" (quotations and citation
omitted)); 1A Charles Alan Wright, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 175 (3d ed.
1999) ("[T]he preclusive effects of guilty pleas do
not apply to constitutional claims that go 'to the
very power of the State to bring the defendant into
court to answer the charge brought against him.' A
defendant who has pleaded guilty may still contend
... that the statute under which he was charged is
unconstitutional." (quoting Blackledge, 417 U.S. at
30, 94 S.Ct. 2098) (footnotes omitted)).
**7 Because a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute directly cuts to "the
power and authority of the court to determine a
controversy," Thompson, 743 P.2d at 1232, it is
necessarily a jurisdictional matter. Accordingly, an
unconditional guilty plea does not operate as a
waiver of a facial constitutional challenge to a
statute, because such a challenge is jurisdictional in
nature. [FN3] *738 Therefore, we address
Defendant's arguments. [FN4]
FN3. The justice court appeal process
analog in Judge Bench's opinion is
somewhat puzzling.
Since justice courts are not courts of
record, traditional appellate review is
generally unavailable or severely limited.
This
notwithstanding,
the
Utah
Constitution guarantees "the right to
appeal in all[ criminal] cases." Utah
Const, art. I, § 12. In City of Monticello v.
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990),
our supreme court ruled that the trial de
novo appellate procedure now set out in
Utah Code Annotated section 78-5-120
(2002)
satisfied
this
constitutional
mandate. See Christensen, 788 P.2d at
518-19. Following a trial de novo,
traditional appeal therefrom is available
only if "the district court rules on the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7).
In our view, this unique process for
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obtaining review of justice court
proceedings has nothing to do with issue
preservation or waiver of nonjurisdictional
constitutional claims by voluntary guilty
plea— section 78-5-120 makes no reference
to either. Indeed, if anything, it is a
recognition of the importance of claims
involving the constitutionality of statutes
or ordinances, specifically contemplating
such challenges in the court of record in
the first appeal. Under the statutory
scheme,
raising
the
constitutional
challenge to the statute or ordinance is the
method by which jurisdiction is conferred
on appellate courts to entertain further
appeals, the defendant having already been
accorded his or her constitutional right of
appeal from the justice court by trial de
novo in a court of record. This is a far cry
from the ability to challenge subject matter
jurisdiction in an initial appeal of right.
FN4. The State argues that Myers v. State,
2004 UT 31, 94 P.3d 211, both addresses
and disposes of the issues herein. The
appellant's claims in Myers were based
upon the Post-Conviction Remedies Act,
see id. at Tf 10; and, to the extent the
appellant alluded to constitutional defects
in a statute, his challenge was not facial.
Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court
characterized his argument as based on an
"allegedly incorrect legal interpretation [of
a rule of law]," and never addressed or
ruled upon the effect of a facial
constitutional challenge. Id. at \ 17.
II. Constitutional Challenge
**8 Defendant argues that the communications
fraud statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and
vague. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2003).
We consider each of his arguments in turn.
A. Overbreadth
[11][12][13] **9 "In considering whether a statute
[is overbroad], a court's first task is to determine
whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount
of constitutionally protected conduct." In re I.M.L.,

2002 UT 110,1[ 1 5, 61 P.3d 1038 (quotations and
citations omitted). We examine "criminal statutes
... with particular care; those that make unlawful a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected
conduct may be held facially invalid even if they
also have legitimate application." Id (quotations
and citations omitted). However, "[o]nly a statute
that is substantially overbroad may be invalidated
on its face." City of Houston v. Hill 482 U.S. 451,
458, 107 S.Ct 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987).
Overbreadth "must not only be real, but substantial
as well." Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 584,
122 S.Ct. 1700, 152 L.Ed.2d 771 (2002)
(quotations and citation omitted).
[14][15][16] **10 When interpreting the
challenged language, "we look to the statute's plain
language and presume that the legislature used each
term advisedly." In re I.M.L., 2002 UT 110 at f
16, 61 P.3d 1038. "Statutory language is overbroad
if its language proscribes both harmful and
innocuous behavior." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935
P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (quotations
and citations omitted). The communications fraud
statute prohibits
devis[ing] any scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money,
property, or anything of value by means of false
or
fraudulent
pretenses,
representations,
promises, or material omissions, and
communicat [ing] directly or indirectly with any
person by any means for the purpose of executing
or concealing the scheme or artifice.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). Defendant
posits that the communications fraud statute is
overbroad "because it permits criminal prosecution
and sanctions in every case involving a
communicationf ] that could be construed as
dishonest." Specifically, Defendant argues that the
communications fraud statute does not require an
intent to defraud, and that it criminalizes innocuous
behavior because "[a]s long as there is an artifice, a
false communication in any form made for the
purpose of executing the artifice, and a desire to
obtain anything of value, the elements of the
communications fraud statute are met." Defendant
also alleges that the modes of communications
prohibited *739 in the communications fraud statute
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are similarly overbroad and prohibit constitutionally
protected conduct. See id. § 76-10-1801(6). We
disagree.

applications." Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
494-95, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982).

[17] **11 First, the communications fraud statute
does not prohibit all false
"pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions,"
only those where an individual seeks "to defraud
another or to obtain from another money, property,
or anything of value." Id. § 76-10- 1801(1).
Second, it requires proof that the false or fraudulent
"pretenses, representations, promises, or material
omissions made or omitted were made or omitted
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless
disregard for the truth." Id § 76-10-1801(7). While
the First Amendment may value some falsehoods
for their contribution to public debate, see New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.
19, 84 S.Ct 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), it has not
given protection to malicious statements that were
made "with knowledge that [they were] false or with
reckless disregard of whether [they were] false or
not." Id. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710. The
communications fraud statute draws the distinction
between criminal and innocent behavior with a
similar mens rea, and thus, it cannot be said that it is
"substantially
overbroad"
and should be
"invalidated on its face." Hill, 482 U.S. at 458, 107
S.Ct 2502. Accordingly, we conclude that the
communications fraud statute is not overbroad on
its face.

[20][21][22] **13 Defendant argues that the term
"artifice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), is
defined too broadly and would encompass any form
of deceit so that ordinary persons would not know
whether the deceit was prohibited. While not
defined in the communications fraud statute,
"artifice" is commonly understood to mean "an
artful stratagem," or a "trick." Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary 106 (9th ed.1986). Black's
Law Dictionary defines "artifice" similarly as "[a]
clever plan or idea, especially] one intended to
deceive." Black's Law Dictionary 108 (7th
ed.1999). Additionally, we do not read the term
"artifice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), in a
vacuum, but rather as it relates to the other terms
within the communications fraud statute. See
Bowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50,U 8, 94 P.3d 915
(stating that "[s]ubsections of a statute should not be
construed in a vacuum but must be read as part of
the statute as a whole" (alteration in original)
(quotations and citation omitted)). Contrary to
Defendant's assertions, the communications fraud
statute does not prohibit all artful stratagems and
tricks, only those meant to, inter alia, defraud
others. While the term "artifice," Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-1801(1), may be construed broadly, "a statute
is not unconstitutionally vague because it is broad."
State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989).
We conclude that the term "artifice," Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), is used with "sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265 (quotations
and citations omitted). Therefore, we conclude that
the term "artifice," as used in the communications
fraud statute, is not unconslitutionally vague. Utah
Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1).

B. Vagueness
[18] [19] **12 Defendant argues that the
communications fraud statute is unconstitutionally
vague in its use of the terms "artifice,"
"communicate," and "anything of value." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), (6)(a). "The
void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute
or ordinance define an offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265 (quotations
and citations omitted). However, because the
communications fraud statute "implicates no
constitutionally protected conduct," Defendant must
show that it "is impermissibly vague in all of its

[23] **14 Defendant next argues that the term
"communicate,"
Utah
Code
Ann.
§
76-10-1801(6)(a), is vague because it is "given the
broadest possible definition" under the *740
communications fraud statute. The communications
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fraud statute prohibits "communicat[ing] directly or
indirectly with any person by any means for the
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or
artifice." Id. § 76-10-1801(1). Additionally, it
specifically states that to communicate "means to
bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to
give by way of information; to talk over; or to
transmit information." Id. § 76-10-1801(6)(a).
Defendant's argument is unavailing. Although
"communicate," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(6)(a)
, is broadly defined, this does not necessarily make
the term unconstitutionally vague. See Wareham,
772 P.2d at 966. Indeed, the communications fraud
statute does not seek to punish those who keep an
artifice or scheme to themselves. Defendant fails to
demonstrate how "ordinary people can[not]
understand what conduct is prohibited," Lopez, 935
P.2d at 1265 (quotations and citations omitted), and
therefore, fails to demonstrate that the term
"communicate," as used in the communications
fraud statute, is unconstitutionally vague. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(6)(a).
[24][25] **15 Finally, Defendant argues that the
phrase""anything of value," Utah Code" Ann. §
76-10-1801(1), is unconstitutionally vague because
it is undefined and left open to a variety of
interpretations. Defendant proffers numerous
hypothetical situations in an attempt to illustrate the
vagueness of the phrase "anything of value." Id.
However, "speculation about possible vagueness in
hypothetical situations not before the [c]ourt will
not support a facial attack on a statute when it is
surely valid in the vast majority of its intended
applications." Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733,
120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000)
(quotations and citation omitted). Defendant was
charged under the communications fraud statute
because he devised a scheme to defraud others of
"money." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). We
believe that "the vast majority of [the
communications
fraud
statute's]
intended
applications," Colorado, 530 U.S. at 733, 120 S.Ct.
2480 (quotations and citations omitted), will
involve incidents where individuals have defrauded
others of "money" or "property," Utah Code Ann. §
76-10- 1801(1), both of which are terms that are
sufficiently understood to allow ordinary citizens to

determine what conduct is prohibited. See Lopez,
935 P.2d at 1265. Additionally, because Defendant
was charged with devising a scheme to defraud
others of "money," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1)
, his actions do not fall within the "anything of
value" realm, id, and thus, he may not challenge
this phrase as unconstitutionally vague. See Village
of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n. 7, 102 S.Ct.
1186 ("One to whose conduct a statute clearly
applies may not successfully challenge it for
vagueness." (quotations and citation omitted)).
[FN5]
FN5. In his brief on appeal, Defendant
states that "[ajrguably, this is precisely the
type of conduct the communications fraud
statute was intended to prohibit."
**16 Defendant's constitutional challenge to the
communications fraud statute fails. We conclude
that the communications fraud statute is neither
unconstitutionally overbroad, nor unconstitutionally
vague.
CONCLUSION
**17 A facial challenge to the constitutionality of
a statute is jurisdictional in nature and, therefore,
we conclude that Defendant's facial challenge to the
constitutionality of the communications fraud
statute is not barred by his voluntary, unconditional
guilty plea. However, in considering Defendant's
facial challenge to the communications fraud statute
on overbreadth and vagueness grounds, we
conclude that it is not unconstitutionally overbroad
or vague. Accordingly, we affirm Defendant's
conviction.
ORME, Judge (concurring):
**18 I concur in the court's opinion. I write
separately to explain my position, because I
recognize the lead opinion represents a departure
from the general prohibition against raising issues
for the first time on appeal, especially in the face of
a guilty plea.
**19 For me, the easy proposition is this: Subject
matter jurisdiction is an issue that may be raised by
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either party or the court at any time. So far as I am
aware, there is no exception to this rule for guilty
pleas. See *741 James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567,
570 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ( "[Subject matter
jurisdiction] is derived from the law. It can neither
be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused.
Objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter may be urged at any stage of the
proceedings, and the right to make such an
objection is never waived.") (internal quotations &
citation omitted), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah
1999).
**20 In this sense, the lead opinion's analogy to
sovereign immunity cases is actually pretty good. If
a plaintiff sued the State without giving the required
presuit notice, and the State did not raise the lack of
notice as a defense below, it would presumably not
be permitted to raise the lack of notice for the first
time on appeal in challenging a judgment that had
been entered against it. However, if giving the
presuit notice is necessary to vest the court with
subject matter jurisdiction, then of course the lack
of notice could be raised for the first time on
appeal. And indeed, giving presuit notice strictly in
compliance with the sovereign immunity statute has
been held to be a matter of subject matter
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit Auth,
2001 UT109,K 16,37 P.3d 1156.
**21 While this kind of subject matter jurisdiction
issue usually arises in civil cases, the concept is the
same in criminal cases. If a guilty plea is entered,
and no issues are reserved for appeal consistent
with State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah
Ct.App.1988), then unless the guilty plea is set
aside as involuntary, all issues are waived on
appeal, except subject matter jurisdiction, which
can never be waived. See James, 965 P.2d at 570.
Thus, if a 32-year-old defendant was charged with
murder in juvenile court and pled guilty, on appeal
to this court he most certainly could challenge the
lack of the juvenile court's subject matter
jurisdiction over an adult charged with murder, see
Utah
Code Ann.
§§ 78-3a-104, -105
(Supp.2003)—even if the guilty plea was otherwise
proper and he never raised the jurisdictional
problem below. The same is true if a defendant

pled guilty to the "crime" of blasphemy, and no
such criminal offense were on the books in Utah. If
he pled guilty, and did not raise below the point that
no such crime existed in Utah, he still could
challenge his conviction by raising, albeit for the
first time on appeal, the lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. And obviously he would succeed. The
trial court simply would lack the judicial power to
convict the defendant of a nonexistent crime.
**22 Here is where it gets admittedly more tricky:
Suppose our criminal code made it a felony to
commit the crime of blasphemy, defined as
"disparaging the one Almighty God or questioning
His existence." If a defendant pled guilty to that
offense, did not preserve a constitutional challenge
for appeal under Sery, and did not raise the
constitutionality issue below, could he raise for the
first time on appeal the facial unconstitutionality,
under the First Amendment, of the statute
criminalizing blasphemy? At one level, it seems
that charges brought pursuant to such a statute
would be just as much a nullity as charges brought,
as in the immediately preceding hypothetical, in the
complete absence of any blasphemy statute. In
simplest terms, in this country there simply could be
no crime of blasphemy-amy statute purporting to
provide
otherwise
would
be
facially
unconstitutional. But he could not raise this
constitutional challenge for the first time on appeal
unless facial unconstitutionality goes to subject
matter jurisdiction. [FN1] Does it? I am not
completely sure, although I can see that, in concept,
an unconstitutional statute is as ineffectual as no
statute.
FN1. Judge Bench points out such an
argument could be reached under the plain
error doctrine. Maybe. But the rescue
opportunity provided by the plain error
doctrine is rather limited. As hereafter
shown, the ability to claim plain error can
itself be waived. In contrast, subject
matter jurisdiction can never be waived.
In the blasphemy hypothetical, if facial
unconstitutionality is a matter of subject
matter jurisdiction, it could be addressed
for the first time on appeal even if plain
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error was not raised, see State v. All Real
Property, 2004 UT App 232,f 13 n. 7;
was inadequately raised, see State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)
(holding that if any of the requirements for
plain error are not met, "plain error is not
established" and cannot be raised); or was
raised too late. See Coleman v. Stevens,
2000 UT 984 9, 17 P.3d 1122 (holding
court would not reach unpreserved issues
under plain error doctrine because plain
error raised for first time in reply brief).
*742 **23 This is what ultimately explains my
vote in this case: No Utah appellate court has
squarely answered the question of whether a
challenge to a criminal statute based on facial
unconstitutionality goes to subject matter
jurisdiction. The lead opinion cites a multitude of
cases that have held it does; Judge Bench's opinion
cites no case that has addressed the question and
held it does not. [FN2] It is admittedly somewhat
counterintuitive for me that a substantive conclusion
of
unconstitutionalityeven
facial
unconstitutionality-defeats
subject
matter
jurisdiction, but that seems to be the prevailing
view. Accordingly, with some trepidation, I concur
in the court's opinion.
FN2. I disagree with Judge Bench's claim
that Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, 94 P.3d
211, considered this question and rejected
it on the merits. The Myers court
described the jurisdictional argument
asserted in the case as being "somewhat
convoluted." Id. at \ 15. Later, the Court
characterized the argument as being
tantamount to a "claim[ ] that the trial
court's decision constituted an 'erroneous
application of the law.' " Id at f 17
(citation omitted). In any event, the
Court's dismissal of the jurisdictional
argument in Myers was premised on the
simplistic notion that " '[a] court has
subject matter jurisdiction if the case is
one of the type of cases the court has been
empowered to entertain by the constitution
or statute from which the court derives its

authority,' " id. at If 16 (citation
omitted)--an obvious overstatement as
readily shown by the sovereign immunity
example, i.e., district courts have general
civil jurisdiction and even jurisdiction over
disputes against the State, but lack subject
matter jurisdiction over such a case if the
presuit notice is flawed in some way.
Another example of the overbreadth of the
pronouncement in Myers is the fact that
appellate courts have the constitutional and
statutory power to consider appeals, and
yet are held to lack subject matter
jurisdiction over appeals that are untimely.
See Utah Const, art. VIII § 3 ("The
Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction over all other matters to be
exercised as provided by statute ...."); id.
§ 5 ("The jurisdiction of all other courts,
both original and appellate, shall be
provided by statute."); Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3) (2002) (specifying Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction); id. §
78-2a-3(2)
(specifying
appellate
jurisdiction of Court of Appeals);
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 161
P.2d 569, 571 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (
"[Fjailure to file an appeal within the
required time limit deprived the court of
subject matter jurisdiction.") (citing
Watson v. Anderson, 29 Utah 2d 36, 504
P.2d 1003, 1004(1973)).
The very best indication that the Myers
court simply did not have before it the
issue we must decide—at least not in any
kind of cogent, well-developed way—is
that the only authority cited in Myers is
two decisions from the Utah Court of
Appeals and the statute giving the district
courts original jurisdiction of "all matters
civil and criminal," subject to certain
limitations. Myers, 2004 UT 31 at \ 16,
94 P.3d 211 (quoting Utah Code Ann. §
78-3-4(1) (2002)). The Myers opinion did
not acknowledge, much less did it treat, the
extensive state and federal jurisprudence
categorizing the facial unconstitutionality
of a criminal statute as being a matter of
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subject
matter jurisdiction-^
virtual
impossibility if the argument had actually
been made and was well-supported, as in
the instant case.
BENCH, Judge (concurring in the result):
**24 I do not necessarily disagree with the main
opinion's analysis of the constitutionality of the
communications fraud statute. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1801 (2003). But, because of the
procedural posture of this case, I would rule that we
cannot reach the issue under controlling Utah law.
[FN1]
FN1. Given the clarity of the Utah law,
decisions from the federal courts are not
helpful. Nor are the federal cases even
consistent with each other. See, e.g.,
United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549,
552 (9th Cir.1989) amended by 907 F.2d
115 (9th Cir.1990) ("The dividing line
between the majority of constitutional
claims waived by a voluntary plea of
guilty, and those that challenge the right of
the state to hale the defendant into court,
and thus survive the plea ..., has not been
crystal-clear.").
**25 As recognized by the main opinion,
Defendant entered an unconditional guilty plea to
three counts of communications fraud. Cf State v.
Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct.App.1988)
(allowing defendants to enter conditional pleas
preserving the right to appeal any specified pretrial
ruling). In the district court, Defendant never
challenged the constitutionality of the statute. Nor
did he enter a conditional plea to preserve his right
to
appeal
the
constitutionality
of
the
communications fraud statute. See id. Furthermore,
Defendant never filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,f 3,
40 P.3d 630 (requiring defendant to file a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea within thirty days after the
entry of the plea before defendant can challenge the
validity of the guilty plea on appeal). Instead,
Defendant filed a notice of appeal directly from his
sentence. Now, for the first time, Defendant

attempts to raise the issues of *743 overbreadth and
vagueness as constitutional challenges to the
communications fraud statute. He claims he can do
so because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be
waived and that the district court lacked jurisdiction
to convict him of violating an unconstitutional
statute.
**26
This
approach
reflects
a
basic
misunderstanding of jurisdiction. The Utah
Supreme Court recently explained subject matter
jurisdiction very succinctly as follows: "A court has
subject matter jurisdiction if the case is one of the
type of cases the court has been empowered to
entertain by the constitution or statute from which
the court derives its authority." Myers v. State,
2004 UT 31,K 16, 94 P.3d 211 (other quotations
and citation omitted); see also Salt Lake City v.
Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 852 (Utah 1994) ("Subject
matter jurisdiction is 'the authority and competency
of the court to decide the case.1 " (citations
omitted)).
**27 The main opinion contends that a facial
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is
necessarily a jurisdictional matter because the
inherent constitutionality of a statute affects whether
a court has the power and authority to decide the
issue. However, without a proper challenge, courts
must presume the constitutionality of a statute.
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional until
the contrary is clearly shown. It is only when
statutes
manifestly
infringe
upon
some
constitutional provision that they can be declared
void. Every reasonable presumption must be
indulged in and every reasonable doubt resolved
in favor of constitutionality.
Jones v. Board of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53,
If 10, 94 P.3d 283 (quotations and citations
omitted). Thus, because the communications fraud
statute was not challenged below, it is presumed to
be constitutional, and the district court had
jurisdiction.
**28 In footnote two of the main opinion, my
colleagues attempt to find support for their
extraordinary decision by pointing to the distinction
between general jurisdiction and subject matter
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jurisdiction. As noted by the main opinion, we do
not focus "on whether subject matter jurisdiction
exists in [this] particular context" because, unlike
claims made against governmental entities-which
require compliance with the Immunity Act-the
communications fraud statute at issue here requires
that nothing be done, by either party, before
criminal defendants can be prosecuted and courts
can exercise subject matter jurisdiction. With
claims against a governmental entity, "the
legislature has explicitly declared how, what, when,
and to whom a party must direct and deliver a
Notice in order to preserve his or her right to
maintain an action against a governmental entity."
Greene v. Utah Transit Auth, 2001 UT 109,^ 15,
37 P.3d 1156. Thus, "[compliance with the
Immunity Act is necessary to confer subject matter
jurisdiction upon a trial court to hear claims against
governmental entities." Id at ^ 16. In the instant
case, as with presumably every other criminal
prosecution, the charging statute does not explicitly
declare what must be done before subject matter
jurisdiction is conferred. Thus, the district court
had general jurisdiction as well as subject matter
jurisdiction due to an absence of legislative
requirements or limitations. [FN2]
FN2. In an attempt to bolster the main
opinion's reasoning, the concurring opinion
discusses
some
rather
bizarre
hypothetical.
First,
the
thirty-two-year-old defendant charged with
murder in juvenile court. Thankfully, this
potential calamity has already been
resolved by our legislature. See Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-3a-104, - 105(l)(a) (2002)
(detailing jurisdiction of juvenile courts).
By contrast, our legislature has not limited
the jurisdiction of district courts in a
similar manner. See Utah Code Ann. §
78-3-4(1) (2002) ("The district court has
original jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Utah
Constitution and not prohibited by law.").
Second, the criminal defendant who pleads
guilty to the nonexistent crime of
blasphemy. If no such crime of blasphemy
existed, then we would not indulge in the

presumption that a nonexistent, unwritten
statute was constitutional. Here, however,
a statute does exist, and, until challenged,
we must presume it to be constitutional.
Third, if a defendant pleaded guilty to the
theoretical crime of blasphemy, and did
not preserve his constitutional challenge,
then he could raise the challenge for the
first time on appeal by arguing plain error.
A plain error challenge could easily be
made
without
making
the
facial
constitutionality of a statute a prerequisite
to subject matter jurisdiction.
As for the concurring opinion's statement
that "[n]o Utah appellate court has
squarely answered the question of whether
a
challenge
based
on
facial
unconstitutionality goes to subject matter
jurisdiction," our supreme court has
squarely addressed the question. In Myers
v. State, 2004 UT 31, 94 P.3d 211, the
Utah Supreme Court explained that even
when Myers argued, for the first time on
appeal, that the wholly and facially
unconstitutional aggravated murder statute
divested the trial court of jurisdiction, he
had "failed to state any legitimate
jurisdictional defect" because ,f[t]he Utah
Code provides that 'the district court has
original jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Utah
Constitution and not prohibited by law.' "
Id at H 16 (quoting Utah Code Ann. §
78-3- 4(1)). The instant case is no
different. Thus, even when Norris argues,
for the first time on appeal, that the
communications fraud statute is facially
unconstitutional,
and
that
such
unconstitutionality goes to the subject
matter jurisdiction of the district court, he
fails "to state any legitimate jurisdictional
defect." Myers, 2004 UT 31 at H 16, 94
P.3d211.
*744 **29 Therefore, if Defendant wanted to
challenge
the
constitutionality
of
the
communications fraud statute, he had to do so first
in the district court. See, e.g., State v. Pugmire,
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P.2d 271, 272 (Utah Ct.App.1995) ("Although
[defendant] raises the issue on appeal, he did not
challenge the constitutionality of this statutory
scheme before the trial court. As a general rule, we
will not consider issues-including constitutional
issues—initially raised on appeal."); State v. Webb,
790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah Ct.App.1990) ("As the Utah
appellate courts have reiterated many times, we
generally will not consider an issue, even a
constitutional one, which the appellant raises on
appeal for the first time.").
**30 This rule applies with equal force to facial
challenges to a statute made for the first time on
appeal. In State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920
(Utah Ct.App.1991), when a, facial challenge to a
criminal statute was raised for the first time on
appeal, this court addressed Archambeau's
challenge only for the "plain error" and
"exceptional circumstances" arguments he made.
See Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922, 926. Defendant,
in the instant appeal, asserts no claim of plain error
or exceptional circumstances.
**31 Allowing defendants to raise constitutional
challenges for the first time on appeal will logically
necessitate overruling a large body of jurisdictional
jurisprudence involving Utah's justice courts. See,
e.g., City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d
513, 517 (Utah 1990) ("[T]his Court [has]
repeatedly held that a person dissatisfied with a
justice court decision could appeal that decision to a
district court and that the district court decision was
final unless the validity or constitutionality of a
statute was at issue, not on appeal, but in the lower
court."); Draper City v. Roper, 2003 UT App 312,
f 2, 78 P.3d 631 (per curiam) (" 'The decision of
the district court [from a hearing de novo following
a justice court's ruling] is final and may not be
appealed unless the district court rules on the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.' "
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7))); South
Salt Lake City v. Terkehon, 2002 UT App 405,1f 6,
61 P.3d 282 ("Utah case law clearly provides that
neither this court nor the Utah Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from proceedings in
the district court held pursuant to an appeal from
the justice court unless the issues raised in the

justice court involve[ ] the validity or
constitutionality of an ordinance or statute."
(quotations and citations omitted)); City of Kanab
v. Guskey, 965 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah Ct.App.1998)
("[Historically, Utah appellate courts have never
had jurisdiction to hear appeals of district court
decisions after a de novo trial on appeal from an
unfavorable justice count judgment, absent the
raising of a constitutional challenge in the justice
court."). The practical consequence of the main
opinion is that defendants will now be allowed to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute in this
court, for the first time, without ever having
bothered to raise the issue in either justice or district
court.
**32 Having failed below to challenge the statute
on grounds of overbreadth and vagueness, and
having failed on appeal to argue either plain error or
exceptional circumstances, Defendant is now
precluded from challenging the constitutionality of
the communications fraud statute. I would therefore
affirm based on Defendant's failure to preserve his
constitutional challenge.
97 P.3d 732, 506 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 UT App
267
END OF DOCUMENT
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T B / ^ O U J ^ U * ^
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, S T A T E ^ F T J T T ^ M J ^ '

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTD7ICATE OF COUNSEL

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No.

vs.
'|2.tcU<u-~<A

f.

T H * * ? ? ^

|Jor>-^

Defendant

LH>icU^\r^ r> KJotviS , hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty (ofnocontest)^) the following crimes:
Degree

Crime & Statutory
Provision
,

•%

A t

tr-mguv-vcj
B.

D.

1

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
Mandatoi .
Minimum

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Informatioa. against me. I have read it, O]
had it read to me, anclJUefiJeretariiithe nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I an
pleading guilty (pfno contest).
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading gu&fy (orido contest/are:

n\

y ^

f i > TVt^g>

or- (Jon

QJZ$J<

i^

f

\A

La.

I miderstand that by pleadmg-g^^LLwill be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleaaUng^ne-etffrtp^ I am not contesting that I committed the
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, u I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute oi
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons foi
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty
(9rjftQd£fiolest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (01
J o contest):
^
\
T
v

U/*4k_

^h^

^V-T»^AN*JM*JV<

0>v^«=l

fimt^

< u J_ -fkjua\

(

Avu^

o^a*

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I pleac
guilty (qfticTcoSest) F)vill give up all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if 3
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understanc

that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed
lawyer's service to me.
I (have not) (have; waivea my right to counsel If I have waived my right to counsel,
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:

If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is >£#** C* IMint^woc
My attorney an^-Lfewe fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of
my guilty (o^no c o i ^ ^ plea(s).
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by a n j ^ ^ i a l
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty fefriocontes^^
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a
trial, a) I would have the right to see and obseiye the witnesses who testified against me and
b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony
of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would
pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose
uot to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also
know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal
to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty
[or<gg^ontes^^)am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged
Drime(s). If I choose tofightthe charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my
sase will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each

element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial is before a jury, the verdic
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or(no contes^Hrgive up the presumption ol
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury 01
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs forme. I understand that I am giving up
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (gfno contes^^understand that if I wish
to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is
entered.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty {or No Contest)PJfea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest), I knov/ that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or
both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five peicent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of
a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate.

Plea agreement My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of
a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and
provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those
explained below:
J^k^. GJ^^vwdt

Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
-ecommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges
x>r sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
relieve the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my ownfreewill and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful
nfluence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or 1 have had it read to me by iny attorney, and I
mderstand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of the statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am ijt5years of age. I have attended school through the / y grade. I can read
md understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which
tfould impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the
nfluence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
inderstanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I amfreeof any mental
lisease, defect, or impairment that would prevent mefromunderstanding what I am doing
>rfromknowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest I will only be allowed to withdraw
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the PostConviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Dated this

*

day of

^^*ve*J~e)r

, 2±*%

DEFENDANT

Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for ^Ccht-^Jl
lU^rt-vY
> the defendant
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe'that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent To the best of my knowledge and belief
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are
accurate and true.

yOTORNE Y FOR DEFENDANT
Bar No.
fokg^

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
^ _ I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
/^(cJ^e^tM AJ'ry-i's
, defendant I have reviewed this Statement of
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct No improper inducements, threats, or coercion
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant The plea negotiations are fully contained
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on-the record before
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public intent.
^ PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
BarNo./OYOa—

Order
Based on the facts Set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representatiojis in court; the Court witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this

?

day of

S^p/e^^*-

,

2^°3.

D1S1RICTCOUK1 JUDCiJb

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

The parties agree to the following settlement terms and conditions in relation to State v. j
hardNorris, case no. 971008355:

\

1. Defendant will enter a plea of no contest to two counts of attempted
ummications fraud, a class a misdemeanor. The communications supporting the two

/

nts are (1) the newspaper advertisement run in the spring of 1993; and (2) the in-person
rting with the victim(s) which culminated with the signing of agreements. The artifice

\

ised to defraud the victims was to foil tnerc aomty to comply with contract agreements and I
i sue and obtain judgments against them.
2. Defendant agrees to waive all appellate rights in relation to the case with the exception
Larrow issues of the constitutionality of the charging statute and jurisdictional issues
viously raised with the Court and presently the subject of the appealfromjudgment in the
nth District Court case, which is presently on appeal
3. The State agrees that any restitution at issue be properly left to civil remedies,
hiding the results of law suits previouslyfiledin relation to the facts and circumstances of the
sent case.
4. The State agrees that the proper sentence is to close the case with credit for time
ved considering that the defendant has already served more than the maximum period of
arceration allowed upon conviction for two class A misdemeanors.

^^^s

Addendum E

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ERNEST W. JONES, 1736
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by: E. Jones
Assigned to: E. Jones

Plaintiff,
BAIL: $150,000.00
Warrant/Release: Non-Jail

-vs-

INFORMATION

RICHARD F. NORRIS
DOB 05/15/55,
OTN
Case No.
Defendant.

The undersigned Brook Plotnick - West Valley City Police Department, under oath states
on information and belief that the defendant, committed
the $rimgs
of:
Dmmitted tne
«BL

C)^

COUNT I
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a TSrird-^egre^Felony, at^592 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT II
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense,'devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses,, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.08. \

COUNT III

4^^^(^ /

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a m d b e f e r ^
at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT IV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNTV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT VI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392,West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT VII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT VIII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT IX
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT X
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or materia] omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.

INFORMATION
STATE OF UTAH v. RICHARD F. NORRIS
DAONo. 97006614
Page 5

COUNT XI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a part} to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at ^392 \\ est 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on oi about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party lo the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
lor the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
flic loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XIII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a Third Degree Ft loir , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March tliiuiiLjh June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Lemmon money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT XIV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Lemmon money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XVI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.

00007

INFORMATION
STATE OF UTAH v. RICHARD F. NORRIS
DAONo. 97006614
Page 7

COUNT XVII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a imrci Degree Felony, ut i j * i west JDUU South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. MORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XVIII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, <u - ^ w est 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud., and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XVIIII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3jyi West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT XX
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.

THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Officer Brook Plotnick, S. Humphrey, B. Gessel, Joan Mattson, Sue Hunter, Kay Crosby,
Mike Mabry, L. Stauffer, Kay Utley, S. Francis, O. Fowler, K. Noland, D. Duffin and S.
Lebaron.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your Affiant bases this Information on police report #94-25376 and the following:
1.
During the Spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisement in the newspaper.
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtained judgmients against many of
these people.
2.

The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to
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fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to
cover up this scheme.

BROOK PLOTNICK
Affiant
Subscribed and sworn M l f e ^ f e * ^
P

1'

dayofMay, 1 9 9 7 . , / g * £ ^ § t f ^ ~ -

MAGISTRATE
Authorized for presentment and filing:
E. NEAL GUNNARSONy^istrict Attorney

Deputy District Attorjafey
May 15,1997
msy/97006614
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Data Table for Initial Criminal Filing
Prosecuting governmental entity: Salt Lake County
Prior related cases: none
Officer's Badge No. 8049
Agency Case Number: 94-25376
Arrest Date:
Jail Booking Number:
Defendant's Sex: Male
Defendant's Social Security Number:
Defendant's Driver's License Number: 8223961
State Issuing Defendant's Driver's License: Utah

Keith L. Stoney (38S8)
City Prosecutor
West Valley City
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, UT 84119
(801) 963-3331
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH (WVC)
Plaintiff,

NORRIS, RICHARD F.
67 8 WILLIAMSBURG
SANDY, UTAH
5/15/55

I N F O R M A T I O N

Case No-^lOGMq^mCL;

Defendant.
The undersigned, KEITH L. STONEY, under oath, states on
information and belief that the defendant, on or about 12 MAY 1994,
at the vicinity of 3392 WEST 3500 SOUTH, West Valley City, Utah,
did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of:

COUNT 1:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A"

COUNT 2:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A"

COUNT 3:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 7 6-10-1801, CLASS "A"

COUNT 4:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A"

This information is based
following witnesses:
MICHAEL MABRY
BONNIE GESSEL
JOAN MATTSON
KAYLYNN CROSBY
LISA STAUFFER
SHERRY FRANCIS
DOUG FAY

on evidence obtained

from the

OETECTIVF. PLOTNICX**PLEASE LET US KNOW IF THERE ARE ADDITION
WITNESSES**

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
bases t h i s information
Y o u r a f f i a n t

on t h e

following:

WITNESSES STATED TO OFFICERS
^
.
^
^
^
^
'
S
K
?
OCCASIONS, UNLAWFULLY DEFRAUDED ^ O T E E R O R B ° B T ^ A N S OF FALSE OR
MONFY, PROPERTY, OR M T ^ ^ ™ ™
^Mllis,
OR MATERIAL
•ppannULENT PRETENSES, R E P R E b b N 1 i r „ vf« TrmT-pprTTT WITH ANY PERSON
BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ^ C O T I N S W*
T H E R S O ^

IN WEST VALLEY AND

THE CITY REQUESTS A WARRANTEE ARREST.
Complain

9 4 - 2 5 3 7 6 , DR, H0RaiS.R2
PTC: ,
December 19, 199 A

2
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1

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT"COURT - SALT LAKE CITY

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3

-oOo-

4

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

5
6
7

Case No. 971008355

vs.

MOTION

RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS, JR.
Defendant.

8

-oOo-

9
10

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 19th day of

11
12
13
14
15

November, 1997, th« auuve-entitled matter came on for
hearing before the HONORABLE L.A. DEVER, sitting as Judge
in the above-named Court for the purpose of this cause,
and that the following proceedings were had.
-oOo-

16
17

For the State:

ERNIE JONES
Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

For the Defendant:

MICHAEL A. PETERSON
Attorney at Law
Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association
424 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

18
19
20
21

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

22

DEC - 2 2003

23
24

PILED

SALT LAKE COUNTY

ty

•T't

Deputy Clerk

COURTS

25

ALAN P. SMITH, CSR

ORfGIWAI

385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. PETERSON:

Judge, could we turn to the Richard

Norris case, please?
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR* PETERSON:

Judge, did you receive a copy of the

latest order that came down from the Court of Appeals on this?
That's why we asked you to—to look at it now.

It just seems

to me in light of the ruling, we can't really proceed.
still waiting for the remittitur.

We're

They've now stayed it while

he goes to the U.S. Supreme Court, so...
It looks like the Utah Supreme Court denied his
petition on September 27th and then he went to the Court of
Appeals and—and indicated to them that he was going to
petition the U.S. Supreme Court. And then I got that order
that I just gave you on the 29th or 30th, indicating they've
granted another stay so it can go to the U.S. Supreme Court.
THE COURT:

Very well.

So, I'll assume that based upon this, that if we
don't hear something from the U.S. Supreme Court, that on
December the 29th, unless there's something given to the Court
of Appeals, that we should hear from them after December the
29th; is that your understanding?
MR. PETERSON:

That's generally our understanding,

Judge, we would hear relatively soon from the United States

2

Supreltie Court on the issue of the writ of certiorari there.

I

take it from Mr. Jones' approach with that order, that he's
asking the Court not to do anything•
THE COURT: Well, I don't think I can do anything,
Mr. Peterson.
MR. PETERSON:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

I think—

I mean, that's the argument you'ye made

in front of me before is, is that—that since there's no
remittitur, I can't do anything.

Now, I've got an order from

the Court of Appeals saying they're staying remittitur.

I

don't think I can do anything*
MR. PETERSON:

Well, that's—that's almost correct.

Actually, the first case, Judge, before you, ending in 5698,
we did ask you to dismiss without prejudice and you went ahead
and did that, based on the pending appeals process—appeals
process.

So, while your Honor is correct that we've used the

remittitur argument, we have asked you to proceed on the
narrow issues of jurisdiction and you have done that.
There7a a companion case, 8355, which has a
duplicate Information filed before your Honor to the
Information filed in 5698.

And consistent with what the Court

has done in the past, we would ask you to at least reach the
issue of our motiorj to dismiss without prejudice in 8355,
given that the appeals process is ongoing in the W6st Valley
prosecution and therefore, this Court is without jurisdiction
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to allow the 8355 filing to stand.
THE COURT:

Mr. Jones, do you want to respond to

that?
MR, JONES: Well, yeah, I just—I don't—I don't
think you can.

There's no question you dismissed the one case

in April while we were waiting for the remittitur.

Then we

got word from the Court of Appeals that they were dismissing
the appeal, so we went ahead and re-filed.

That's the case

that's still pending.
And what you said at that time is, it's okay to refile, but I'm going to hold the warrant until we get a
decision from th$ Court of Appeals, so that's essentially
where we are. And i f —
THE COURT:

And that's the position the Court is

going to take in this matter.
MR. JONES: Okay.
THE COURT:

I'm not going to dismiss any more cases,

I'm not going to entertain any arguments on any dases until we
have the ^resolution on the appeals resolved; so, I don't want
to have cases set in front of me again and arguments, because
I'm not going to hear them until I have a remittitur back from
the Court of Appeals.
MR. JONES:

Thanks, Judge.

MR. PETERSON:
THE COURT:

That's all I have, your Honor.

Thank you.
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Addendum F

FILED
'•'•^ Court of Anpeafg

MAR 2 6 1S97
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
West Valley City,

)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 960151-CA

Richard Norris,
Defendant and Appellee.
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Orme.
This matter is before the court pursuant to West Valley
City's motion to dismiss its appeal, to which defendant objects,
and pursuant to defendant's motion to stay this court's February
18, 1997 order, to which West Valley City objects.
West Valley Cicy seeks to dismiss its own appeal of the
circuit court's order dismissing misdemeanor charges against
defendant on the ground that the facts supported a felony charge,
over which the circuit court did not have jurisdiction.
Subsequently, the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office indicated
its intent to file a felony charge in district court on the same
facts. Since the circuit and district courts were consolidated
in July, 1996, the district court now has jurisdiction whether
the charges are filed as felonies or as misdemeanors.
Defendant, through counsel, asserts that this appeal should
not be dismissed because West Valley City will now file felony
charges against him out of vindicniveness for his filing of a
motion to dismiss in circuit court. However, even assuming the
truth of these assumptions, that issue is not before this court
and may be raised in a different appeal, if and when defendant is
convicted of felony charges. There is simply no reasoned
argument that West Valley City should not be allowed to dismiss
its own appeal from the circuit court's decision.
Defendant's pro se argument that this court should stay its
own order directing him to file a response to the motion to
dismiss by March 3, 1997 is without merit. The trial court does
not have jurisdiction to consider defendant's latest motion for
substitute counsel, and defendant's claim that counsel will not
adequately represent him does not appear to be supported by the
filings in this court.
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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion to
stay is denied and this appeal is dismissed.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

Gregory K^^rirter^uu

